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PHILOSOPHY OF GAUḌAPĀDA (ALĀTAŚĀNTI-PRAKARAṆAṀ)

By JNANENDRALAL MAJUMDAR

(Continued from Vol. VIII Part 2, p. 14)

"IT is the inner realisation by noble wisdom of noblewisdom, and in this there is no thought of existence or non-existence."[1] It is inexpressible, for here the triple distinction between the knower, knowledge and known vanishes and thus there is triple emancipation. It is knowledge which is unattainable, for it is the eternal truth and infinite.[2] Dualistic knowledge is divided into Laukika (worldly) and Śuddhalaukika (super-worldly) according as it refers to the gross perception of objects as they are perceived by ignorant people, or to the subtle or refined (śuddha) perception of such advanced people as feel that objects are unreal but are still not so firmly established in true jñāna as to be able to give denial to their perception of them. He to whom the world is like a flower in the sky, never born, is the truly wise man possessed of lokottara jñāna.

Verses 87 to 89 deal with this tripartite division of knowledge.

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[1] L: *Sūtra*, xxiii and xxxv.

[2] See quotations under verse 99.

Ryukan Kimura in "*A historical study of the terms Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism*[3]" says that the doctrine that both subject and object are existing is of the Sthaviravādins and Sarvāstivādins, that subject is existing but object is not existing is the Yogācāra doctrine, that both are not-existing is the Mādhyamika doctrine.[4]

The eight vijñānas—The world and the super-world, as explained above, constitute the saṁsāra which is the playground of the triple combination of the perciever, the perceived and perception. Knowledge here is dualistic and tantamounts to perception, the light or consciousness which establishes a connection between the perceiver and the perceived. It is also the essence of the perceiver and the perceived, for on it depends their very existence. Transcendental knowledge is the spring-head from which issue the three conjoined streams of the perceiver, the perceived and perception. It is Vijñāna or Vijñāna itself (vijñānamātra) and, as issuing from it, the three are also nothing but vijñānas. This is the monistic idea. Vijñāna itself is the Paramārtha, while the three are samvṛti. They are Vijñāna itself as it appears through the veil of ignorance which though obtaining in the saṁsāra since beginningless time, is an unreality, a nothing. Thus Vijñāna can be divided primarily into two kinds, namely, Paramārtha-Vijñāna and samvṛti-Vijñāna. Paramārtha-vijñāna is called Ālaya-vijñāna, because it is the source of samvṛti-vijñāna. It is also called citta (Mind) or citta-Mātra (Mind itself). Gauḍapāda has used both the terms-vijñāna and citta—for it.[5] The objective world is cittadṛśya, that is, Mind-right, the sight of Mind, or what is seen of Mind itself. In many places Gauḍapāda has not used this term for the objective world[6]. The subjective world

[3] Calcutta University Publication.

[4] Page 185.

[5] *Vide* verses 26-28, 45, 54, 72.

[6] Vide verses 28, 64, 66.

is composed of Manas (the ego) and Manovijñāna (egoconsciousness). Gauḍapāda has not used these terms, but has referred to the subject as Jīva (living being), dṛk (seer) and grāhaka (cogniser). Then there are the five vijñānas of the five senses. Thus in samvṛti we have seven vijñānas, namely, Manas, Manovijñāna and the five sense-vijñānas, which with Vijñāna itself, the Paramārtha, make up the number eight. For a fuller explanation of the terms of this classification it would be best to quote from the originals.

The Buddha says :—"With the Manovijñāna as cause and supporter, Mahāmati, there rise the seven vijñānas. Again, the Manovijñāna is kept functioning as it discerns a world of objects and becomes attached to it, and by means of manifold habit-energy (or memory) it nourishes the Ālaya-vijñāna. The Manas is evolved along with the notion of an ego and its belongings, to which it clings and on which it reflects. It has no body of its own, nor its own marks; the Ālayavijñāna is its cause and support. Because the world which is the Mind itself is imagined real and attached to as such, the whole psychic system evolves mutually conditioning. Like the waves of the ocean, Mahāmati, the world which is the mind-manifested, is stirred up by the wind of objectivity, it evolves and dissolves. Thus, Mahāmati, when the Manovijñāna is got rid of, the seven vijñānas are also got rid of."[7]

The following analysis made by Aśvaghoṣa is interesting and instructive:- "By the law of causation (hetupratyaya) in the domain of birth-and-death (saṁsāra) we mean that depending on the Mind (i.e. Ālayavijñāna) an evolution of ego (Manas) and consciousness (Vijñāna) takes place in all beings. What is meant by this? In the all-conserving mind (Ālayaviñjāna) ignorance obtains; and from the non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents,

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[7] *L. Sūtra*, Liii.

that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularises. This is called the ego (Manas). Five names are given to the ego (according to its different modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness (Karmavijñāna) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an un-enlightened mind begins to be disturbed. The second name is evolving-consciousness (Pravṛtti-vijñāna, that is, the subject) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is representation-consciousness, in the sense that the ego (Manas) represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clear mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the five objects of sense, it represents them at once, instantaneously and without any effort. The fourth name is particularisation-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness (i. e., memory), in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness (or attention, manaskāra) it (manas) retains and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful as well as agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future; and also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by, and in imagination anticipates things to come.

"Therefore, the three domains (Triloka) are nothing but the self-manifestation of the Mind (i.e., Ālayavijñāna which is practically identical with Suchness, Bhūtatathatā). Separated from the mind, there would be no such things as the six objects of sense. Why ? Since all things owing the principle of thier existence to the mind (Ālayavijñāna), are produced by subjectivity (smṛti), all the modes of particularisation are the self-particularisation of the Mind. The Mind in

itself (or the soul as Suchness) being, however, free from all attributes, is not differentiated. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostasised and established only through ignorance (Avidyā) and subjectivity (smṛti) on the part of all being, have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They evolve simply from the ideality of a particularising mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.

"By ego-consciousness (Manovijñāna) we mean that all ignorant minds through their succession-consciousness cling to the conception of I and not-I (that is, a separate objective world and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, or phenomena-particularising-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices (āsrava), intellectual as well as affectional.

"While the essence of the mind (Vijñāna) is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled mind. But in spite of the defiled mind, the Mind (itself) is eternal, clear, pure and not subject to transformation.

"Further, as its original nature is free from particularisation, it knows in itself no change whatever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of existence.

"When the oneness of totality of things (Dharmadhātu) is not recognised, then ignorance as well as particularisation arises, and all phases of the defiled mind are thus developed. But the significance of this doctrine is so extremely deep and unfathomable that it can be fully comprehended by Buddhas and no others.[8]"

The principle enunciated above is strictly followed by Gauḍapāda throughout the Prakaraṇa.

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[8] *Awakening of Faith*, pp. 75-80.

As regards the five sense-vijñānas, the Buddha says, the reasons whereby the eye-consciousness arises are four. What are they? They are: (1) the clinging to an external world, not knowing that it is of mind itself; (2) the attaching to form and habit-energy accumulated since beginningless time by false reasoning and erroneous views; (3) the self-nature inherent in the vijñāna; (4) the eagerness for multiple forms and appearances. By these four reasons, Mahāmati, the waves of the evolving vijñānas are stirred on the Ālayavijñāna which resembles the waters of a flood. The same (can be said of the other sense-consciousnesses) as of the eye-consciousness. This consciousness arises at once or by degrees in every sense-organ including its atoms and pores of the skin; the sense-field is apprehended like a mirror reflecting objects, like the ocean swept over by a wind. Mahāmati, similarly the waves of the mind-ocean are stirred uninterruptedly by the wind of bjectivity; cause, deed and appearance condition one another inseparably; the functioning vijñānas and the original Vijñāna are thus inextricably bound up together; and because the self-nature of form etc. is not comprehended, Mahāmati, the system of the five consciousnesses (vijñānas) comes to function. Along with this system of the five vijñānas, there is what is known as Manovijñāna (i. e., the thinking function of consciousness) whereby the objective world is distinguished and individual appearances are distinctly determined, and in this the physical body has its genesis. But the Manovijñāna and other vijñānas have no thought that they are mutually conditioned and that they grow out of their attachment to the discrimination which is applied to the projections of Mind itself. Thus the vijñānas go on functioning mutually related in a most intimate manner and discriminating a world of representations.[9]

As regards the rise, abiding and ceasing of the vijñānas

[9] *L. Sūtra*, ix.

the Buddha says:—"There are two ways, Mahāmati, in which the rise, abiding and ceasing of the vijñānas take place, and this is not understood by the philosophers. That is to say, the ceasing takes place as regards continuation and form. In the rise of the vijñānas, also, these two are recognisable; the rise as regards continuation and the rise as regards form. In the abiding also, these two (are distinguishable): the one taking place as regards continuation and the other as regards form.

"(Further), three modes are distinguishable in the vijñānas: (1) the vijñāna as evolving (2) the vijñāna as producing effects, and (3) the vijñāna as remaining in its original nature.

"(Further), Mahāmati, in the vijñānas, which are said to be eight, two functions generally are distinguishable, the perceiving and the object-discriminating. As a mirror reflects forms, Mahāmati, the perceiving vijñāna perceives (objects). Mahāmati, between the two, the perceiving vijñāna and the object-discriminating vijñāna, there is no difference; they are mutually conditioning. Then, Mahāmati, the perceiving vijñāna functions because of transformations taking place (in the mind) by reason of a mysterious habit-energy, while, Mahāmati, the object-discriminating vijñāna functions because of the mind's discriminating an objective world and because of the habit-energy accumulated by erroneous reasoning since beginningless time.

"Again, Mahāmati, by the cessation of all the sense-vijñānas is meant the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna's variously accumulating habit-energy which is generated when unrealities are discriminated. This, Mahāmati, is known as the cessation of the form-aspect of the vijnānas.

"Again, Mahāmati, the cessation of the continuation-aspect of the vijñānas takes place in this wise: that is to say, Mahāmati, when both that which supports (the vijñānas) and that which is comprehended (by the vijñānas) cease to function. By that which supports (the vijñānas) is meant the habit-

energy (or memory) which has been accumulated by erroneous reasoning since beginningless time and by that which is comprehended (by the vijñānas) is meant the objective world perceived and discriminated by the vijñānas, which is, however, no more than mind itself.

"Mahāmati, it is like a lump of clay and the particles of dust making up its substance, they are neither different nor not-different; again, it is like gold and various ornaments made of it. If, Mahāmati, the lump of clay is different from its particles of dust, no lump will ever come out of them. But it comes out of them, it is not different from the particles of dust. Again, if there is no difference between the two, the lump will be indistinguishable from its particles.

"Even so, Mahāmati, if the evolving vijñānas are different from the Ālayavijñāna, even in its original form the Ālaya cannot be their cause. Again, if they are not different the cessation of the evolving vijñānas will mean the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna, but there is no cessation of its original form. Therefore, Mahāmati, what cases to function is not the Ālaya in its original self-form, but is the effect-producing form of the vijñānas. When this original self-form ceases to exist, then there will indeed be the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna. If, however, there is the cessation of theĀlayavijñāna, this doctrine will in no wise differ from the nihilistic doctrine of the philosophers."[10]

The substance of these quotations is beautifully set forth in verses 45 to 57 through the illustration of a firebrand.

Two-fold egolessness (*nairātmya*)—"What is the two-fold egolessness? (It is the egolessness of persons and the egolessness of things. What is meant by egolessness of persons? It means that) in the collection of skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas there is no ego-substance, nor anything belonging

[10] *L. Sūtra*, IV.

to it; the vijñāna is originated by ignorance, deed and desire, and keeps up its function by grasping objects by means of the sense organs, such as the eye, etc, and by clinging to them as real; while a world of objects and bodies is manifested owing to the discrimination that takes place in the world which is of Mind itself, that is, in the Ālayavijñāna. By reason of the habit-energy stored up by false imagination since beginningless time, this world (viṣaya) is subject to change and destruction from moment to moment; it is like a river, a lamp, wind, a cloud; (while the Vijñāna itself is) like a monkey who is always restless, like a fly who is ever in search of unclean things and defiled places, like a fire which is never satisfied. Again, it is like a water-drawing wheel or a machine; it (i.e., the Vijñāna) goes on rolling the wheel of transmigration, carrying varieties of bodies and forms, resuscitating the dead like the demon Vetāla, causing the wooden figures to move about as a magician moves them.

"Now, Mahāmati, what is meant by the egolessness of things? It is to realise that the Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanaṣ are characterised with the nature of false discrimination. Mahāmati, since the Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas are destitute of an ego-substance, being no more than an aggregation of the Skandhas, and subject to the conditions of mutual origination which are casually bound up with the string of desire and deed, since thus there is no creating agent in them, Mahāmati, the Skandhas are even destitute of the marks of individuality and generality; and the ignorant owing to their erroneous discrimination, imagine the multiplicity of phenomena, the wise, however, do not."[11]

Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas constitute the world of persons and things in their multifold existence. A person or jīva is a collection of them appearing as an organised living being. Separately they are things. The Skandhas are

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[11] *L. Sūtra*, xxvi.

five in number, namely, Rūpa, Vedanā, Samjñā, Saṁskāra and Vijñāna. Rūpa is form or body; Vedanā is feeling or sensation; Samjñā is perception or thought; Saṁskāra is activities, mentation or conformation;[12] and Vijñāna is consciousness or cognition. Dhātus are the "factors of consciousness (18 in number=12 Āyatanas+6 Vijñānas)"; and Āyatanas are the six sense-fields, (12 in number=5 sense "organs+5 sense objects · 1 mind+1 Dharmas or things in general or abstract ideas.")[13] The five Skandhas contain all the Dhātus and Āyatanas, for body contains the elements which are the objects of the senses and feeling etc. are fields for the play of the mind. Thus the individuality of a person is constituted solely of the five Skandhas and nothing else. He has a body consisting of the elements, the sense-organs and the brain; when a sense-organ comes in contact with an object a sensation is generated which is caught up by the mind, perceived, worked upon, discriminated, and distinguished in conformity with mental impressions stored up in the mind since beginningless time, and then the object is cognised as such-and such a thing. Objects thus determined and sensations, perceptions, mentations and cognitions determining them vary from moment to moment, and are consequently unreal, the products of false imagination. The cognising person and the cognised objects are therefore devoid of any abiding self-substance or ego, destitute of any permanent marks of individuality and generality. They evolve in consequence of the Ālayavijñāna being confused or veiled by ignorance as has been explained before in connection with the eight Vijñānas. The five sense-Vijñānas, Manovijñāna and Manas, which is called Vijñāna as one of

[12]Saṁskāra is translated as activity by Mrs. Rhys Davids in her translation of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, Part II, as mentation by Bhikshu Silācāra in his translation of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, and as conformation by Suzuki in his translation of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, Lii. 52. Saṁskaras are counted, composed of all forms of potentiality of the mind. *McGregor* p. 135.

[13] McGregor p. 137.

the Skandhas, go on functioning so long as ignorance, or the beginningless attachment to unreal objects, obtains. When ignorance is destroyed, the world of multiplicities in the shape of persons and things vanishes, for they have no abiding ego-substance in them to permanently maintain their individual characters.

The egolessness of Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas is further proved by the Buddha's teaching of mutual origination or Pratītyasamutpāda which is referred to in verse 28. The chain of mutual origination is :-Ajñāna (ignorance), Saṁskāra (deed and desire, habit-energy), Vijñāna (cognition, consciousness), Nāma-Rūpa (name and form), Saḍāyatanas (six-fold field), Sparśa (contact), Vedanā (feeling, sensation), Tṛṣṇā (craving), Upādāna (grasping), Bhava (becoming), Janma (birth). Considering that Nāma-Rūpa is conditioned by Vijñāna and Vijñāna by Nāma-Rūpa, there are 12 links (called Nidānas or causes) in the chain:—The following from the *Mahāpadāna Suttānta* explains the chain:- "To Bodhisattva Vipassi it occurred:—

Where birth is there is death and decay.
Where becoming is birth also is present.
Where grasping is there is becoming.
Where craving is there is grasping.
Where feeling is there is craving.
Where contact is there is feeling.
Where six-fold field is there is contact.
Where name-and-form is there is six-fold field.
Where cognition is there is name-and-form.
Where name-and form is there is cognition.
"Birth is the condition of death and decay.
Becoming is the condition of birth.
Grasping is the condition of becoming
Craving is the condition of grasping.
Feeling is the condition of craving.
Contact is the condition of feeling.

Six-fold field is the condition of contact.
Name-and-form is the condition of six-fold field.
Cognition is the condition of name-and-form.
Name-and-form is the condition of cognition.

"Cognition turns back from name-and-form, it goes not beyond. Only as follows can one be born or grow old or die or fall from one condition or reappear in another ; that is, in that cognition is conditioned by name-and-form and name-and-form by cognition, the six-fold field by name-and-form, contact by the six-fold field, feeling by contact, craving by feeling, grasping by craving, becoming by grasping, birth by becoming, decay and dying by birth, and so too grief, lamentation, ill, sorrow and despair come to pass. Such is the coming to be of the entire body of ill."[14]

In explaining the mutuality between cognition and name-and-form the *Mahānidāna Suttānta* says:—

"Were cognition not to enter into the mother's womb name-and-form would not be constituted therein. Were cognition, after having descended into the mother's womb, to become extinct, name-and-form would not come to birth in this state of being. Were cognition to be extirpated from one yet young, youth or maiden, name-and-form would not attain to growth, development, expansion. Wherefore, cognition is the basis, genesis, cause of name-and-form.

"Again, were cognition to gain no foot-hold in name-and-form, then there would not be manifested, in the coming years, that concatenation of birth, old age, death and the uprising of ill. Wherefore, name-and-form is the basis, genesis, cause of cognition. In so far only can one be born, grow old, etc, in as far as this is, namely, name-and-form together with cognition."[15]

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[14] Rhys David's translation.

[15] Rhys Davids' translation.

The worldly existence of a person, constituted of five Skandhas, thus contains 10 out of the 12 links or nidānas. It is these which suffer momentary changes, are born, die and transmigrate. The momentary Vijñāna or cognition of the person is the consequence of ajñāna (ignorance) and saṁskāra (deed and desire or habit-energy, stored up since begnningless time)[16] the first two of the nidānas. The term saṁskāra has evidently given trouble to the translators as we have seen before, for it is difficult to find a single English word to stand for it. It is in fact, the store of energy generated, since beginningless time, by the play of volition (cetanā, desire, will) and action (karma) in a person and is the result of inscrutable ignorance veiling the true Vijñāna, called in this connection, the Ālayavijñāna. "The Mind being influenced by habit-energy there arises a something resembling real existence (bhāvābhāsa); as the ignorant do not understand, it is said that there is the birth (of realities)."[17] The triple world owes its existence to the Mind put into confusion by means of habit-energy."[18] "There is no such evolving in the Mind itself which is beyond comprehension."[19] Depending upon the Mind, there appears (within) a mind and without a world of individual objects (rūpiṇaḥ); this and no other is an external world which is imagined by the ignorant."[20] "Body, property and abode are objectifications of the Ālayavijñāna, which is in itself above (the dualism of) subject and object."[21]

The two forms of egolessness are categorically stated in verses 25 to 28 and verses 68 to 71, and discussed throughout the Prakaraṇa.

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[16] Vide quotation from *L. Sūtra*.

[17] *Sagāthakam* 213.

[18] *L. Sūtra* xxxi.

[19] *L. Sūtra*, ix.

[20] *Sagāthakam* 70.

[21] *L. Sūtra*, vii.

Seven-fold Śūnyatā (emptiness).—The egolessness or unreality of persons and things together with the reality of Ālayavijñāna are included in the comprehensive conception of seven-fold Sūnyatā or emptiness. Persons and things are characterised with six forms of emptiness, while Ālayavijñāna is the great Emptiness (Mahāśūnyatā), because in itself it has nothing to do with the world of persons and things. "To the Yogins there is one reality which reveals itself as multiplicity and yet there is no multiplicity in it[22]. Asked about emptiness, the Buddha said, "Emptiness, emptiness, indeed! Mahāmati, it is a term whose self-nature is false imagination. Because of one's attachment to false imagination, Mahāmati, we have to talk of emptiness, no-birth, non-duality and absence of self-nature. In short, Mahāmati, there are seven kinds of emptiness : (1) The emptiness of individual marks (Lakṣaṇa-Śūnyatā), (2) the emptiness of self-nature (Bhāvasvabhāva-Śūnyatā), (3) the emptiness of no-work (Apracarita-Śūnyatā), (4) the emptiness of work (Pracarita-Śūnyatā), (5) the emptiness of all things in the sense that they are unpredicable (Nirabhilāpya-Śūnyatā), (6) the emptiness in the highest sense of ultimate reality realisable only by noble wisdom (Paramārtha-Āryajñāna-Mahāśūnyatā) and (7) the emptiness of mutuality (Itaretara-Śūnyatā) which is the seventh.[23] Then the Blessed one goes on to define each of these forms of emptiness. These definitions have been quoted under the verses in which they have been established, namely, verses 19, 23, 60, 67, 79, 80 and 91. Itaretara-Śūnyatā is the Anyonyābhāva of the Nyāya Philosophy and from the standpoint of emptiness it is the least important. Gauḍapāda utilises it in his refutation of the idea of causation, for when the effect is born there is not the cause and when the cause is born there is not the effect[24].

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[22] L. *Sūtra*, lv.

[23] L. *Sutra*, xxvii.

[24] verse 17.

Of the other forms of śūnyatā the most important are Bhāva-svabhāva-Śūnyatā and Paramārtha-Āryajñāna-Mahāśūnyatā. The former, translated as emptiness of self-nature, is, more literally, emptiness of being-svabhāva, that is, the emptiness of the svabhāva, or self-nature, of what are supposed to be being, or existing, in the world; it is the emptiness of the Parikalpita and Paratantra svabhāvas, the two-fold egolessness of persons and things. The latter, however, is the truth of the ultimate reality which reveals itself when the emptiness of the world of multiplicity is thoroughly understood; it is the truth of the Parinispanna svabhāva. It is such-as-it-is, untouched by the world as it is. Hence, as Aśvaghoṣa has aptly said, it has the two-fold aspect of Śūnyatā and Aśūnyatā non-emptiness), and the same thing is said by Gauḍapāda in verse 72.

The world is *neither Śāśvata (eternal) nor Uccheda (annihilated)*—

The Buddha has persistently combated the notions of eternalism and nihilism about the world. The idea of eternalism rises from considering the world as composed of particulars which are eternal and not subject to causation and that of nihilism rises from not considering the true existence of the ultimate reality of which the particulars are a false presentation and from thinking that with the disappearance of a particular the conditions of ignorance, deed and desire which caused its appearance are annihilated.[25] Whatever comes to be passes away, was the life-long teaching of the Buddha and his last words before parinirvāṇa were, "Decay is inherent in all component things. Work out your salvation with diligence".[26] Particulars are egoless as such and cannot, therefore, be eternal as such. But although they are devoid of any particularistic self-nature they are in their essence, which is

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[25] *Vide* quotations under verse 57.

[26] *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra.*

their true self-nature, the universal reality, the Ālayavijñana or Dharmadhātu. Thus considered, "they are what is seen of Mind itself", essentially universals or, rather, the universal. But so long as the conditions of ignorance, deed and desire will obtain, they will appear and reappear and reappear, appear as particulars of samvṛti or Paratantra existence. Hence, the Budda said, "I always preach emptiness which is beyond eternalism and nihilism. Saṁsāra is like a dream and a vision and Karma vanishes not."[27] The multiplicity of the world which is subject to birth and death is, like a dream and a vision, not eternal, but it is not also nihil because it is the manifestation of Ālayavijñāna under the influence of ignorance, deed and desire. "Mahāmati," said the Blessed one, "my teaching consists in the cessation of sufferings arising from the discrimination of the triple world, in the cessation of ignorance, desire, deed and causality, and in the recognition that an objective world, like a vision, is the manifestation of Mind itself."[28] "Because the world which is the Mind itself is imagined real and attached to as such, the whole psychic system evolves mutually conditioning. Like the waves of the ocean, Mahāmati, the world which is the mind-manifested is stirred up by the wind of objectivity, it evolves and dissolves."[29] "When the (ideas of) body, property and abode are cherished in what are nothing but the manifestation of Mind itself, the external world is perceived under the aspects of individuality and generality, which, however, are not realities."[30]

(To be continued)

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27 L. *Sūtra*, xxvii.

28 L. *Sūtra*, vi.

29 L. *Sūtra*, liii.

30 L. *Sūtra*, xxxi.

BHAVABHŪTI'S INDEBTEDNESS TO KAUṬILYA

By DASHARATHA SHARMA

IN a paper contributed to the *IHQ.*, XXV, Part 2, I have shown Kālidāsa's indebtedness to Kauṭilya for the *Arthaśāstra* material utilised in the *Raghuvaṁśa*. That another great Sanskrit dramatist, Bhavabhūti, also borrowed freely from the *Kauṭilīya* would be shown here. By Bhavabhūti's time, Kauṭilya indeed, appears to have become such an authority that, disregarding the anachronism thus involved, Bhavabhūti could make Rāvaṇa's minister, Mālyavān, quote from the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*[1] and say, यथोक्तं "लघ्वपि व्यसनपदमभियुक्तस्य कृच्छ्रसाध्यं भवति" इति तत्र च विभीषणावग्रहतः प्रतिविधानम् ।[2]

Of Bhavabhūti's dramas, the *Uttra-Rāmacarita*, had no place for diplomacy, and therefore also none for the use of the *Kauṭilīya*. In the *Mālatīmādhava*, Bhavabhūti goes to the *Arthaśāstra* occasionally for a few words and ideas. The verse,[3]

बहिः सर्वाकारप्रगुणरमणीयं व्यवहरन्
परान्यूहस्थानान्यपि तनुतराणि स्थगयति ।
जनं विद्वानेकः सकलमभिसन्धाय कपटै-
स्तटस्थः स्वानर्थान् घटयति च मौनं च भजते ।।,

has, perhaps, been inspired by the following passages from the section on counsel in the *Arthaśāstra*:[4]—

(१) आकृतिग्रहणमाकारः । तस्य संवरणमायुक्तपुरुषरक्षणमाकार्यकालात् ।
(२) तस्मान्नास्य परे विद्युः कर्म किञ्चिच्चिकीर्षितम् ।
(३) नास्य परे विद्युः छिद्रं विद्यात्परस्य च ।
गूहेत् कूर्म इवाङ्गानि यत्स्याद्विवृतमात्मनः ।।

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[1] VII, 5.

[2] Todar Mall *Mahāvīracaritam*, p. 91. The words from the *Arthaśāstra* have been put within inverted commas.

[3] *Mālatīmādhava*, Act I, II. 103-6, Dr. R.G. Bhandarkar's edition

[4] I, 15.

For Kāmandakī's role as निसृष्टार्थदूती, we may refer to the next topic in the *Kauṭilīya*, the *dūtapraṇidhi*, which begins with the *sūtras*[5]:—

उद्धृतमन्त्रो दूतप्रणिधिः। अमात्यसम्पदोपेतो निसृष्टार्थः। पादगुणहीनः परिमितार्थः। अर्धगुणहीनः शासनहरः।

In Act II, line 156, of the drama[6], the description of Vasurāta as *Kuṭila-naya-niṣṇāta-manas* naturally takes one's mind to the *Kauṭilīya*. In fact Vasurāta appears to be guided throughout by the rules laid down in this masterly treatise on statecraft. He wants to give his daughter, Mālatī, in marriage to Mādhava, and yet does not do so openly for fear that he would offend the *Pradhāna-prakṛti*, i.e., the ruler[7]. This action is wholly in consonance with the dictates of Kauṭilya who states; "self-interest should be the first and constant thought of a wise man, for the life of a man under the service of a king is aptly compared to life in fire; whereas fire burns a part or whole of the body if at all, the king has the power either to destroy or advance the whole family, consisting of sons and wives of his servants."[8]

The drama, however, in which Bhavabhūti has the greatest opportunity of using the *Kauṭilīya* is the *Mahāvīracarita*. Rāvaṇa's minister, Mālyavān, is an expert in Kauṭilyan statecraft. He uses technical terms from the *Arthaśāstra* and advocates methods which might rightly be termed Kauṭilyan or Machiavellian, and, in the right Kauṭilyan

[5] I. 16.

[6] Dr .R. G. Bhandarkar's edition.

[7] "प्रधानप्रकृतिकोपस्त्वेवं परिहृतः" Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar, the editor of the drama, equates प्रधानप्रकृति with अमात्य (Notes, pp. 91-2). But this is far from being the view of Kauṭilya whose work Bhavabhūti studied and followed. The enumeration of the seven *prakṛtis* begins with svāmin, showing thereby that *svāmin* is the *pradhāna-prakṛti*. Specifically too he states:

तत्कूटस्थानीयो हि स्वामी (III,1)

राजा राज्यमिति प्रकृतिसंक्षेपः (III,2)

[8] V, 4, the last two verses.

spirit, nicely balances one set of conditions against the other, to discover the exact policy that should be pursued. If it rendered possible the realisation of some selfish aim, it mattered little whether the methods followed were moral or immoral; whether they benefitted or destroyed people who foolishly relied on the ruler.

We find Mālyavān on the stage in the second Act. His statement[9]:—

अमोघमस्त्रं क्षत्रस्य ब्राह्मणानामनुग्रहः
दुरासदं च तत्तेजः क्षात्रं च ब्रह्मसंयुतम्,

is very much like Kauṭilya's saying[10]—

ब्राह्मणेनैधितं क्षत्रं मन्त्रिमन्त्राभिमन्त्रितम्,
जयत्यजितमत्यन्तं शास्त्रानुगतशस्त्रितम्।

In the *Mālatīmādhava* Bhavabhūti has, as we have seen, a निसृष्टार्थदूती. In the *Mahāvīracarita*, we have a वार्ताहर [11] deputed by Mālyavān to Paraśurāma. The *Rākṣasa* minister has many alternative possibilities before himself. In a conflict between Rāma and Paraśurāma, which Mālyavān was trying to bring about, all would be well, if the former were defeated. The irate Paraśurāma could not stop without slaying his antagonists. But in case of Rāma's victory, everything was bound to go wrong. Rāma, as the विजयी of the धर्मविजयी Paraśurāma, would be popular. Even Rāvaṇa's subjects, the *devas*, were bound to pass over to Rāma's side, because there is bound to be disaffection among the *Prakṛtis*, if they are ill-treated by an *asura-vijayin*."[12]

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[9] *Mahāvīracarita*, II, 5.

[10] *Arthaśāstra*, I, 9.

[11] He is, I think, identical with the शासनहर of Kauṭilya.

[12] नित्यानुषक्तो ह्यसुरविजयिनामवयानतः प्रकृतिकोप :—
(Todar Mall, *Mahāvīracarita*, p. 42). For the full discussion of the possibilities, referred to above, see the same edition of the drama, pp. 35-43.

For the words, धर्मविजयी, असुरविजयी and the like, thus used, the reader would do well to turn to the first chapter of Book XII of the *Kauṭilīya* which states—

त्रयोभियोक्तारो धर्मासुरलोभविजयिन इति। तेषामभ्यवपत्त्या धर्मविजयी तुष्यति।.... भूमिद्रव्यपुत्रदारप्राणहरणेनासुरविजयी।

Causes of disaffection among the *Prakṛtis* (प्रकृतिकोप) have been dealt with in the *Arthaśāstra*.[13] The passage, "तं चेत् प्रकृष्टतममुत्साहशक्तिसम्पदा धर्मविजयिनं विजयेत सर्वे तं विजयिनमनुजानीयुः। तदैव हठाक्रान्तिनित्यनिभृतक्रुद्धा देवा प्रसह्यैनमधिकुर्युः। नित्यानुषक्तो ह्यसुरविजयिनामवमानतः प्रकृतिकोपः"[14] might fitly be compared with the following quotations from the *Arthaśāstra* :—

(i) आघातैः प्रधानानां मान्यानां चावमाननैः।
प्रकृतीनां क्षयो लोभो वैराग्यं चोपजायते॥[15]

(ii) बलवन्तमन्यायवृत्तिमभियुक्तं प्रकृतयो नानुगृह्णन्ति निष्पातयन्त्यमित्रं वास्य भजन्ते। दुर्बलं तु न्यायवृत्तिमभियुक्तं प्रकृतयः परिगृह्णन्त्यनुनिष्पतन्ति वा।[16]

Mālyavān's next appearance on the stage is in Act IV. He devises means to exile Rāma from Ayodhyā. If the supposed orders of Kaikeyī are not carried out, it would be a blot on the character of the विजिगीषु, Rāma; and the right sort of विजिगीषु, though Bhavabhūti does not make the point clear, has to be, as Kauṭilya points out, a man of sound character.[17] In case Rāma repaired to the forest, which was the most likely alternative, he could, by various wily tactics, be carried near the *Rākṣasas* in Daṇḍakāraṇya and overcome by them. To institute a verbal com-

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[13] VII

[14] *Mahāvīracarita*, Todar Mall's edition, p. 91. As would be obvious from a comparison of this passage with the parallel passages from the *Arthaśāstra* quoted above, *prakṛtis* included not only subjects but also ministers and other officers.

[15] VII, 5.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] See the *Arthaśāstra*, VI, 1 and 2.

parison with the *Kauṭilīya* we quote here the words of Bhavabhūti—

"ततोनेन योगाचारन्यायेन सुदूरमाकृष्य रक्षसामङ्कमुपनीतस्य विन्ध्यकान्तारेष्व-देशज्ञस्य विचरतः सुकराण्यवस्कन्दनानि स्युः। विराधदनुकबन्धप्रभृतयो हि दण्डकारण्यसत्रेषु तीक्ष्णाश्चरिष्यन्ति। शक्या हि लुप्तप्रभुशक्तेरुत्साहशक्तिश्छद्मनाभिसन्धातुम्।[18]

The word, तीक्ष्णाः, used here can best be understood by referring to the *Kauṭilīya* which defines them as ये जनपदे शूरास्त्यक्तात्मानो हस्तिनं व्यालं वा द्रव्यहेतोः प्रतियोधयेयुस्ते तीक्ष्णाः.।"[19] And as regards the way the *tīkṣṇas* were used ultimately that too was perhaps suggested by the chapter entitled योगवामन, which, among other things states:—

ततः प्रयोजयेद् योगान्.. हास्तिकामं वा नागवनपालहस्तिना लक्षण्येन प्रलोभयेयुः। प्रतिपन्नं गहने एकायनं वातिनीय घातयेयुर्बद्ध्वा वापहरेयुः

यत्रास्यारक्षि सञ्चारो दुर्दिने संकुलेषु वा॥
विप्रस्थाने प्रदीप्ते वा प्रविष्टे निर्जनेऽपि वा:
. . . .
प्रहरेयुररींस्तीक्ष्णाः पूर्वप्रणिहितैः सह॥[20]

Mālyavān's view regarding the comparative utility of प्रभुशक्ति and उत्साहशक्ति appears to be similar to that of Kauṭilya who states, "He who has power overreaches by virtue of his strength the king possessing more energy ....Rulers possessing power (even those that were) women, minors, lame and blind, conquered the earth by defeating or buying those who had more energy."[21]

According to Mālyavan, Rāma was in many ways an irreconcilable enemy of Rāvaṇa. Being a भूम्यनन्तर ruler, he was a प्राकृतशत्रु; as a Kṣatriya, he was a नित्यशत्रु. Because of his being too strong an enemy to be dealt with openly, उपांशुदण्ड was the best way to punish him. His wife must be taken away to make him either commit suicide or repent and come to terms with Rāvana.

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[18] Todar Mall *Mahāvīracarita*, pp. 87-88.
[19] I, 12.
[20] XIII, 2
[21] Shamashastry—*Arthaśāstra*, pp. 339-340.

Here again Kauṭilyan influence is apparent. Kauṭilya's definition, भूम्यनन्तरः प्रकृत्यमित्रः is there. उपांशुदण्ड is a well known Kauṭilyan prescription for ills caused by people who could not be punched openly.[22] The words, पारतप्याप्यथ वा घटेत सन्धौ, remind one of the *sūtras*, तेजो हि सन्धानकारणम्। नातप्तं लोहं लोहेन सन्धत्ते।[23]

Mālyavān regarded Vibhīṣaṇa also as Rāvaṇa's enemy. Vibhīṣaṇa was a सहजरिपुः,[24] i.e. in Kauṭilya's words, an enemy on account of belonging to the same family. Kauṭilya has no chapter on the treatment of brothers. Bhavabhūti therefore utilises the chapter entitled, राजपुत्ररक्षणम्, regarding Vibhīṣaṇa also as a राजपुत्र. The Kauṭilyan *sūtra*, अहिभयमेतदिति पाराशराः,[25] has been expanded by Mālyavān into the line, रिपुः प्रत्यासत्तेरहिरिव भयं नो जनयति.[26] Kauṭilya's *sūtras*, तस्मात् स्वविषयादपकृष्टे सामन्तदुर्गे वासः श्रेयानिति। वत्सस्थानमेतदिति कौणपदन्तः। वत्सेनेव धेनुं पितरमस्य सामन्तो दुह्यात्[27] find an echo in Mālyavān's statement, खरदूषणत्रिशिरसस्तु कुलसदृशवृत्तयो राजानमुपतिष्ठन्ते यतस्ते वत्सेनेव धेनुं राजानमर्थान् द्रुहन्ति[28]. Kauṭilya's काष्ठमिव हि घुणजग्धं राजकुलमविनीतपुत्रमभियुक्तमात्रं भज्येत[29] is suitably changed in the *Mahāvīracarita* to तदिदमन्तर्भेदजर्जरं राजकुलमभियुक्तमात्रं भेद्येत.[30] The औरसं भयं of the drama[31] is perhaps nothing but a misreading for the Kauṭilyan औरभ्रकं भयं.[32] And as for यथोक्तं लघ्वपि व्यसनपदमभियुक्तस्य कृच्छ्रसाध्यं भवति, it is as already pointed

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[22] राज्योपघातिनस्तु वल्लभाः संहता वा ये मुख्याः प्रकाशमशक्याः प्रतिषेद्धुं दूष्यास्तेषु धर्मरुचिरुपांशुदण्डं प्रयुञ्जति। (V., 1)

[23] *Arthaśāstra*, VII, 3.

[24] तुल्याभिजनः सहजः, VI, 2.

[25] I, 17,

[26] I, 17, 10.

[27] Todar Mall—*Mahāvīracarita*, IV, 7.

[28] I, 17, 15-17.

[29] Todar Mall—*Mahāvīracarita*, p. 91, 11-1-2.

[30] I, 17, 24.

[31] p. 91, line 3.

[32] p. 92, line 6.

[33] I, 17, 12-13 तस्मादन्तपालदुर्गे वासः श्रेयान् इति। औरभ्रकं भयमेतदिति पिशुनः।

above, a quotation from the *Kāuṭilīya*, without the slightest change in its wording.

Vibhīṣaṇa is regarded further, as a very dangerous foe, because the *prakṛtis* love him on account of his आभिगामिक and आत्म *guṇas*.[34] As to what these *guṇas* are we have to refer to the *Kauṭilīya* which states—

(१) महाकुलीनो दैवबुद्धिः सत्त्वसम्पन्नो वृद्धदर्शी धार्मिकः सत्य-वागविसंवादकः कृतज्ञः स्थूललक्षो महोत्साहोऽदीर्घसूत्रः शक्यसामन्तो दृढबुद्धिरक्षुद्रपरिषत्को विनयकाम इत्याभिगामिका गुणाः।

(२) वाग्मी प्रगल्भः स्मृतिमतिबलवानुदग्रः स्ववग्रहः कृतशिल्पोऽव्यसनो दण्डनाय्यकारापकारयोर्दृष्टप्रतीकारी ह्रीमानापत्प्रकृत्योर्विनियोक्ता दीर्घदूरदर्शी देशकालपुरुषकारकार्यप्रधानः सन्धिविक्रमत्यागसंयमप्रणपरच्छिद्रविभागी संवृतोऽदीनाभिहास्यजिह्मभ्रुकुटी क्षणः कामक्रोधलोभमोहस्तम्भचापलापत्तपैशुन्यहीनः शुक्लस्मितोदग्राभिभाषी वृद्धोपदेशाचार इत्यात्मसंपत्।

Rāvaṇa's *prakṛtis* were not well disposed towards him. The remedy, तत्र च विभीषणावग्रहतः प्रतिविधानम्[35] prescribed by Mālyavān, has been suggested by the Kauṭilyan teaching, प्रतिहन्तुमादातुं वा विरागः प्रधानावग्रहसाध्यः। निष्प्रधाना हि प्रकृतयो भोग्या भवन्त्यनुजाप्याश्चान्येषामनापत्सहास्तु प्रकृतिमुख्यप्रग्रहैस्तु बहुधा भिन्ना गुप्ता भवन्त्यापत्सहाश्च[36]. It is necessary also to consult the *Kauṭilīya*, for उपजाप and प्रतिजाप, if we do not mistranslate Mālyavān's statement, उपजापिताश्च प्रतिजपन्ति प्रकृतयः[37]. The methods of punishment, प्रकाशदण्ड, तूष्णींदण्ड, संरोधन and अपसारण find their best treatment in the *Kauṭilīya*; and finally even Mālyavān's hope that the *dharmamaya* Rāma would, on the death of Rāvaṇa, give Laṅkā to Vibhīṣaṇa appears to be based on the following *sūtras* :

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[34] Todar Mall—*Mahāvīracarita*, p. 90, line 14.

[35] VI, I.

[36] *Ibid* p. 91, line 5.

[37] VII, 5.

[38] IX, 5

[39] Pickford translates, "the subjects are disaffected and conspire together." This is the translation followed also by Todar Mall and Antindoram Borooah.

(१) न च हतस्य भूमिद्रव्यदारानभिमन्येत। कुल्यानप्यस्य स्वेषु पात्रेषु स्थापयेत् कर्मणि मृतस्य पुत्रं राज्ये स्थापयेत्।[40]

(२) त्रयोभियोक्तारो...तेषामभ्यवपत्या धर्मविजयी तुष्यति...भूमिद्रव्यप्राणहरणेनासुरविजयी।[41]

The rest of the scenes in the drama do not require the use of the *Kauṭilīya*. Yet a few words from it can be found here and there, showing how deeply the *Śrotriya*, Bhavabhūti, had quaffed at the forte of the *Arthaśāstra*. Mālyavān cannot help speaking of प्रणिधिकृत्य and अतिसन्धान[42] Indra wonders that even Rāvaṇa's relative, Kubera, desires Rāvaṇa's death, and Chitraratha explains it by saying, किं चित्रं सहजाः किल ते मिथः शत्रवः, कृत्रिमतापि निधिपुष्पकादि हरणवृत्तेर्दुवृत्तस्य सुप्रथिता'[43]. Bhavabhūti's account of the siege of Laṅkā, though traditional owes something to the *Kauṭilīya*. Kauṭilya's advice regarding the destruction of वीवध, आसार and प्रसार leads to the composition of the verse,

मनुष्यपोतमात्रेण सानुजेन पुरी तव।
रुध्यते स्म यथासारवीवधाद्यपि दुर्लभम्॥[44]

A careful student of Bhavabhūti and Kauṭilya would, I am sure, find some more instances of such loans on the part of Bhavabhūti. By the eighth century it was not much of plagiarism to borrow even verbatim from Kauṭilya; it was rather a matter of some pride to be so familiar with the thought and language of an author then regarded almost as the creator of *Arthaśāstra*.[45]

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40 *Arthaśāstra*, VII, 16.

41 *Ibid*, XII, 1.

42 See Todar Mall—*Mahāvīracarita*, pp. 159 and 160.

43 *Ibid*, p. 173, lines 1-3.

44 XII, 4 and XIII, 4

45 *Ibid*, p. 167, lines 18-19, VI, 19. Ignorant of the *Kauṭilīya*, some scribes have changed the reading to यथासारं वीवधाद्यपि। Todar Mall's separation of the words यथा and सार also is probably a mistake.

46 Cf, the *Kāmandakīya-nītisāra*, I, 2-7 and III, 6.

SRILINGA TANTRA

By S. C. Dhar

About 20 years back on a Rathayātrā festival day an image of Kālī (but in fact of Tārā) was installed at Shillong in the Garikhana quarter opposite the Vaccine Depot on the Gauhati Road by a party headed by Sri Prakāśānanda, a Tāntrika Sannyāsī, having Bhairavī with a number of female children begotten by him. When the interested party gave out that the place was anciently sacred, which fact they had gathered from the *Śrīliṅga Tantra*, which they kept concealed without allowing anybody not interested in the business to see it, some of us persisted by several means to get a copy of the Tantra, which confidentially passed several hands, when the present writer managed to secure a torn copy on payment by private means. In April 1945, when a literary assembly met at Shillong, the present writer was allowed to read only a portion of the work as a new discovery with notes of his own. This portion was particularly interesting as it contained verses of some historic value relating to the manners, customs and characteristics of the Khasi race and an interesting description of Shillong which is said to have derived its name from Śrīliṅga. This attracted the attention of a gentleman connected with the Hindu Mission Headquarters at Kalighat, who took a copy from this writer for publishing as he thought it would promote the cause of the Mission if the Khasis were given a Tāntrika form of Hinduism; others wanted me to make it public so that a critical opinion may be elicited and this article is an attempt in this direction; unfortunately, he did nothing, neither did he care to return me the copy.

A few miles on the south of the present Shillong town (now a city with its rapidly growing population) lies a lofty hill the summit of which is called Shillong Peak and the

British Officers who founded the town gave it the name after that peak; some of the examiners of my article at the assembly would spell the name as Śrī Liṅga Tantra instead of *Śrīliṅga Tantra*. The former seems to bear a perverted meaning obscurely with some obscene implication.

Tāntrika literature is after all not very old and the research scholars hold that it could never date earlier than the 9th century and a comparatively older Tantra viz. *Merutantra* contains a passage with perverted English name as इंद्रोजा : नवष्ट पञ्चा सन्द्राश्चपि ताविनि 965? So I do not agree that the presence of the word in a verse of the *Śrīliṅga Tantra* takes away all its value whatever may be the date of its birth. Raja Ram Mohan Roy, when dealing with the ancient Hindu scriptures, wrote that the Tantras were forged works and bore a seducive character and they also advocated a religion with an attitude of rivalry towards the Vedas. We have such passages from *Tantrakalpataru*, a later compilation as "अस्त्राणि तु चतुषजानिनी तानिपूर मया उपतन्त्रसंख्या कतिकोऽपि वक्तुं न शक्नोति"। धूर्तैर वकम्पितानि दिने दिने शतानि वि।" and from a comparatively still older Tantra "*Kulārṇava*" a verse- "वेदशास्त्रपुराणानि सामान्या गणिका इव। दुर्लभा शाम्भवी विद्या गुप्ता कुलवधू इव॥" which supports the contention of the Raja. I, however, hold that though the Tantra books as we see them in their present form with their language cannot go even beyond the ninth century, the Tāntrika faith is not a new thing seeing that it is found to have a place in the Indus Valley civilisation. Besides, we find that there is a practice in India that when a new temple is set up, a pamphlet in Sanskrit is brought to light giving a sanctity to the place. We are apt to doubt the old origin of this "*Śrīliṅgatantra*".

In a slope of the Shillong Peak there exists a sacred grove of the Khasis (Lao Kyndng) where they would not cut a green tree in it. There is a hollow pit which when we accompanied the Yājñika Brahmacārī from Nepal (who

perfomed about the time of the first European war a Yajña in the compound of the Gurkha Ṭhākura Bāḍī for 45 days to bring back the world peace) for a visit to the place, he declared it to be the remnant of an old Yajñakuṇḍa. This lends colour of some sanctity of the "Śrīliṅga Śailakam" glorified in the Tantra which contains verses vividly descriptive of the sanctity and glory of the hill Śrīliṅga Śailakam and incidentally throws a grin light as it does on the peculiar customs and characteristics of the Khasi Race which I reproduce below as I wish the manuscript had better be reviewed later on by research scholars to ascertain whether it has any value to get it published.

अथ श्रीलिंगशैलमाहात्म्यम्

मृत्तिका लोहिता 'यत्र' नारी लोहितदर्शना।
श्रीलिंगशैलकं वन्दे तान्त्रिकाभीष्टपूरकम् ॥१॥
भैरवः प्रकाशः यत्र भैरविका यलन्धरी (?)
श्रीलिंगशैलकं वन्दे तान्त्रिकाभीष्टपूरकम् ॥२॥
गयायामक्षयो वटः पितृकार्यप्रपूरकः।
श्रीलिंगशैलकं वन्दे सर्वाभीष्टप्रपूरकम् ॥३॥
कामाख्यामंडलमध्ये त्रियोजनः तेजसोज्ज्वलं।
श्रीलिंगशैलकं वन्दे यत्रास्ते काली सदया ॥४॥
त्रिकोणं त्रियोजनं व्याप्तं कामदं मोहिमउत्तंगम्।
निर्मलं मरुदनिलं निदाघवाससुखदम् ॥५॥
मेघमंडलपर्वतादैशान्ये यदवस्थितम्।
श्रीलिंगशैलके रविः मेघै रक्षादितर्मुहुः ॥६॥
सधवा विधवा नास्ति नास्ति नारी अपूरुषा।
श्रीलिंगशैलकं वन्दे यत्रास्ते नारी स्वतंत्रा ॥७॥
खसवंशः वृद्धिर्यत्र श्वेतद्वीपसमागतात्।
श्रीलिंगशैलकं वन्दे यत्रास्ते नारी सुलभा ॥८॥
पुरुषो रक्षति नारीं सर्वत्रेति प्रथा श्रुता।
श्रीलिंगशैलके धन्ये नारी रक्षति युवकम् ॥९॥
पुरुषात् नारी तु यत्र शिक्षिताधिक्येन वरा।
श्रीलिंगशैलके धन्ये नारी सर्वाधिकारिणी ॥१०॥
जयन्ती प्रमीला राज्यं ख्यातं यद् महाभारते।
श्रीलिंगशैलके रम्ये तत्तत्प्रथा प्रचलिता ॥११॥

UDAYANA ON CAUSALITY

By H. C. Joshi

The problem of causality is one which has been discussed since the dawn of philosophical speculations. The emergence of this vast objective world, the bondage of the empirical self, the ethics of life as also the freedom of the individual self—all these and many other important problems of philosophy involve in one way or other an understanding of this all powerful law of causality. There were certain thinkers who denied any law of "Cause and effects". Besides the Cārvākas who deny many rational philosophical propositions, there were others also who refrained from assigning any real place to this phenomenon. The Mādhyamikas would never be prepared to accept that any one thing emerges from any other thing. According to them the kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva which we perceive to hold between things is a sort of misapprehension. The Advaitins also (Gauḍapāda is very emphatic on this point) refuse to apportion any ultimate reality to this phenomenon. According to them the cause (if there is any such thing as cause) is only real, the effect is an illusion or vivarta. So ultimately for them also no law of causality exists.

The Advaitin's position can very well be understood in this context. To them this objective world has no "pāramārthika Sattā". So anything operating within this world would also be denied as real. But the Cārvākas, who do believe in an outside world, fail to explain this phenomenon of cause and effect which we daily perceive. The earthen jar and cloth are always seen to emerge from clay and threads respectively and invariably. How are they going to explain away a process which is so obvious in its varied workings. Without accepting any law of causa-

lity which regulates the emergence of new and varied things this change according to them is 'akasmāt'. By 'akasmāt' some mean "accidentalism" and others the 'unique nature of things'. Both these shades of thought have been referred to by the *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* thus: "Should time or nature (svabhava) or necessity or chance or the elements be considered as the cause or he who is called the person ?"[1]

That we always find cloth emerging from threads is, they say, no solid ground for postulating that thread is the cause of cloth. To this almost all the schools of Indian philosophy object. They have their own conceptions of the working of the law.

It is, however, to be noted that though all these different schools readily agree upon this point none of them except the Naiyāyikas, who are our torch-bearers in many respects, have attempted to set forth the problem so logically and beautifully and discuss it convincingly. Udayanācārya, the Naiyāyika par excellence, has dealt with this question in his epoch-making work the *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali* in a remarkable manner. In the true spirit of a philosopher he does not take for granted the existence of "kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva" howsoever obvious it may look, but subjects it to a close scrutiny.

Before listening to what Udayana says let me quote a few lines of the late Professor Hiriyanna distinguishing between what is called 'Yadṛcchā-vāda' or 'Animitta-vāda', and 'naturalism' or 'Svabhāvavāda'. Thus he says in his inimitable way:

"While the one maintains that the world is a chaos and ascribes whatever order is seen in it to mere chance, the other recognizes that things are as their nature makes them. While the former denies causation altogether, the latter acknowledges its universality, but only traces all changes to the thing itself to which they belong. Every-

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[1] Translation—Max Muller.

thing is unique and its entire history is pre-determined by that uniqueness. Hence according to the Svabhāva-vāda, it is not a lawless world in which we live; only there is no external principle governing it.

It is self-determined, not undetermined. So this doctrine unlike the other, recognizes necessity as governing all phenomena; but it is a necessity that is inherent in the very nature of a thing, not imposed upon it by any external agency".[2]

Udayanācārya takes note of one or two more shades of animittavādins and answers them all. Thus he proceeds—

न हि अयं संसारः अनेकविधदुःखमयो निरपेक्षो भवितुमर्हति तथा हि स्यादेव, न स्यादेव-न तु कदाचित्स्यात्।

Indeed, the world constituted of many kinds of miseries does not deserve to be non-dependent. If that were so, either it can only be or it can only not be; it cannot sometimes be.[3]

We see in this world things coming into being at a particular point of time. All the things do not come into being all the time. Anything and everything sees the light at a particular instance. That is, things are of contingent nature (kādācitka) and such things depend for their coming into being upon certain other things. A thing which is there irrespective of any other thing will be eternal, as for instance, Ākāśa. So is God and other eternal things. A non-eternal thing and yet independent is inconceivable. Contingency and 'dependence' go together says the Naiyāyikas.

The opponent might perhaps say that contingency and non-dependence can and do go together for things

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[2] *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. pp. 103-104.

[3] English translation of the *Kusumāñjali* by Swāmī Ravi Tirtha. Vol. I, Adyar. p. 3.

are not produced from something (akasmāt bhavati). To this the Ācārya says:

हेतुभूतिनिषेधो न स्वानुपाख्यविधिर्न च।
स्वाभावर्णना नैव अवधेर्नियतत्वतः॥

"It cannot be a denial of the cause or of production; nor can it be a postulation of something incomprehensible (as cause). To describe it as nature is not in this way, since there is invariableness of limits."[4] The Ācārya says that your statement " अकस्माद्भवति " may be interpreted in five different ways and no matter in which way we understand it the difficulties are insuperable. He deals with these one by one and disposes them off.

The first way of understanding ' अकस्माद्भवति ' is that we deny the cause (hetuniṣedha). If you mean that things have their being without any cause then the things concerned will be beginningless and thus cease to be contingent for there will be nothing that will determine its relation with only a particular point of time and not before it—prāgasattvasādhakābhāvāt as the commentary puts it. This 'causelessness' being always there the effect will also have been there since time without beginning. Thus things cease to be contingent in nature which is absolutely against the universal experience. If by अकस्माद्भवति we deny the production of effect (कस्माद्भवति) notwithstanding the presence of what may likely be considered as cause the effect will never come into existence even for all time for there will be nothing that will determine its coming into being at all—'Sadbhāvaniyāmakābhāvāt' as the commentary puts it.

The opponent still clings to his position and says that the production of the effect is not dependent upon anything other than itself but that it comes out of itself. This is technically called 'Sva-vidhi'. This position, says

[4] Translation of the *Kusumāñjali*. p. 3.

Udayana, is no less rediculous. A thing which does not exist before its production cannot produce itself. It tantamounts to saying that anything can come into existence out of nothing. The relation of cause and effect holds good only between things which are anterior and posterior in relation to each other. The same thing cannot be both anterior and posterior to itself. The *Kusumāñiali* thus puts it :—

पौर्वापर्यनियमश्च कार्यकारणभावः। न चैकं पूर्वमपरं च। तत्त्वस्य भेदाधिष्ठानत्वात्—

"And the relation of cause and effect is the rule of being prior and posterior. And the same cannot be both the prior and posterior, because being such rests on difference".[5]

Nor can the effect come out of something indefinaple or incomprehensible. For in that case there will arise the contingency of things becoming eternal similarly as when the position taken up was that the effects have no cause.

The opponent is adamant and still refuses to abandon his position. He only gives a new meaning to his dictum अकस्माद्भवति. According to him though themselves causeless things appear at a particular time for such is there nature. For instance, though a jar has many causes (of course in common parlance) such as clay, stick, the potter together with his wheel and thread, it occupies the place occupied by the clay out of which it has been furnished and not that occupied by any other of the causes enumerated above. Why is this so ? asks he. It is, he declares boldly, due to its very nature. Similarly, things can appear only at a particular time without any cause for such is their nature. But the Naiyāyika says that this ground is also not sure as this also is inconsistent with the contingent nature of a thing. Nor can a thing be both eternal (सदातन) and contingent

[5] Translation.

(कादाचित्क). By contingent nature of a thing is meant not only that it is connected with a particular time but that it should also be non-existent before it. Once this definition of contingency is accepted we have to recognize a prior limit of a product and this prior limit is what we call cause. The Cārvāka has now no option but to admit a prior limit to the appearance of any object. But he is not willing to accept any positive thing as the prior limit. Rather he suggests that the prior non-existence of the effect may be regarded this previous limit. But this position lands us into twofold difficulty. At the time, say, of the prior non-existence of a jar there are other positive items also such as the 'kapālas' and the potter etc. How are we going to overlook their presence? As a matter of fact the apprehension of the prāgabhāva itself is impossible till the kapālas and the other things are not present. Bare prior non-existence has been there all the time and will be there even when a ghaṭa has been produced. As such the production of jar will never cease.

The opponent has now been almost cornered beyond redemption. He is constrained to admit certain positive things as prior limit but, being on all fours to save himself, feels impelled to state that those limits need not be considered at all for they are not contributory and thus his position is safe. सन्तु ये केचिद् अवधयो न तेऽपेक्ष्यन्ते.

The opponent is now asked to clarify the meaning of his statement "not to be considered".

Does he mean that they are not fixed as clay is fixed as the prior limit of jar or that they are fixed but not contributory? If the first alternative is accepted then in the absence of any fixity an ass may as well be considered as one of the prior limits of smoke like fire, a suggestion which is glaringly absurd.

As for the second alternative what is the necessity of any contribution other than of setting a prior limit?

Such aprior limit is what is meant by our 'Causality'. This meaning of svabhāva is acceptable to us.

The 'Svabhāva Vadin' wakes up again and frowns upon the above conclusion. According to him once more 'Contingency' is consistent with non-dependence. As for instance, Ākāśa and Atman have no cause and yet Ākāśatva inheres in Ākāśa and Atmatva in Atman. Why is it so?, asks the svabhāvavādin in spite of the fact that there is nothing to determine the characteristics of the aforesaid substances as is the case with the kapālas in relation to a jar. The only answer available is that it is due to their svabhāva. The principle may be extended elsewhere also. Due to their unique nature the jars and such other things appear only at particular times and not always. The Ācārya points out the fallacy of the above argument. According to him what the opponent has said in respect of the eternal substances holds water but not which has been said regarding the non-eternal objects. Either we accept a prior limit to the appearance of an object or we do not. In the first case 'a thing not having a prior limit is not a pratiyogin of the prior non-existence whereas kādācitkatva amounts to saying that a thing is a pratiyogin of its prior non-existence. These two positions are quite contradictory and so one and the same thing cannot be both non-dependent and contingent. The absurdity arising out of not accepting a fixed prior limit has already been observed. Thus the only tenable position is that all the effects have prior limit which is fixed and which is both of the nature of positive and negative things. This limit is what we understand by the term 'cause'

The opponent is now restive and tries to put forward an objection which he thinks is fatal to the Naiyāyika and to his followers in this matter. He for the time being accepts that certain things have prior limit and some have only posterior limit and yet others are limited both ways. For instance, prāgabhāva has the posterior limit, pradhvaṁsābhāva

has a prior limit whereas the ordinary positive things have both the limits. All this one has to a cept on the basis of experience. Similarly a positive thing whose prior limit is not available should be considered causeless. And such a first cause we must postulate otherwise this series of cause and effect will become beginningless and thus if one thing can be causeless why not the others. Udayana says that this is not difficult for we do not regard this series to have begun at all. Rather it is beginning-less. Moreover, if something as the causeless cause is admitted its effect will also have to be considered beginningless there being nothing else which can be said to determine the time of the appearance of the said effect. If it is said that it is the nature of the effect to appear only on a particular day the conditions obtaining that day will be available on previous days also and thus the effect again becomes co-existent with its cause. That is only a contingent cause and can produce a contingent effect. The opponent is now finally silenced and the existence of the law is finally established.

The above arguments as advanced by Udayana are unassailable and shall have to be accepted by thinkers otherwise his dissenters.

RABINDRANATH TAGORE'S DRAMATIC BEGINNINGS

THE CONFLICT AND THE EMERGENCE: EARLY PLAYLETS

By AMAR MUKERJI

RABINDRANATH'S emergence as a dramatic artist has been ascribed by Thompson to the Poet's gifts as an actor and to the theatrical conditions at Calcutta which had then infused in every young man a desire to write for the stage. Thompson has in the same strain also said that Rabindranath "should turn to the drama was inevitable" which perhaps means that there must have been some deeper artistic urge behind Tagore's emergence as a dramatist than a mere charm for the theatre. To enquire into this will not only make an interesting excursion into the inner frames of Tagore's poetic mind as it was then working, but will provide us with a solid basis of judgment on which his early works like *Rudracānda*, *Nalinī*, *Kalmṛgayā* and *Vālmīki-pratibhā* can be tested. Moreover, Tagore had once said that "in poems the deep tragedies of my life find final lodgement. In drama can be found the conflict" [1] which basically implies that in the drama the poet gives new significance to personal sorrow and seeks through dramatic display an emotional relief at the riddance of the surplus feeling which makes his heart go wild. Rabindranath the poet, as we would presently show, had endeavoured to express feelings in his lyrics which are either disagreeably real or agreeably unreal but behind the sadness or underneath a joyous state can be felt a desire to eliminate feelings which are 'too real' i.e. oppressively real. This may as well be the truth underlying Aristotle's theory of purgation[2] but Aristotle perhaps

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[1] Quoted in *Rabindranath Tagore* by B.K. Roy, New York, 1914, p. 197.

[2] Cf. Bosanquet: *Aesthetics*, p. 235.

was thinking mainly of the spectator's emotion and not the author's. But when Rabindranath says that "the emotional surplus in man seeks its outlet in the creation of art"[3], he thinks perhaps also in terms of the artist. It remains a fact that the main urge behind Tagore's dramas as compared to that behind his lyrics is the direct outpouring of the heart of his characters against the direct outpouring of the poet's own heart. From that point of view, to use the words of S. Alexander, "a lyric may be regarded as a special form of the drama where the speaker happens to be the poet himself."[4]

How the process had come to work in the case of Rabindranath can be understood only after we take stock of the association and environment in which he grew and then analyse, to adopt Middleton Murry's phrase, his 'within and without.' The society in which Tagore was born was a quiet one, quiet like the city suburbs whose confusion and turmoil had not rent the skies.[5] The last vestiges of a dying aristocracy were all that he found when he was born; his father then overloaded with debt was practising a strict family economy and there was hardly any trace of an 'inflated pride and arrogance'[6] among the members of the household who were then living with the greatest austerity. "Luxury was a thing", wrote Rabindranath, "almost unknown to me in the days of infancy."[7] But there was, all the same, a particular impress of individuality on the mind of the poet[8]—an individuality that is based on a solid propagation of genuine culture.[9]

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[3] *Personality*, p. 11

[4] S. Alexander: *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, pp. 88

[5] *Ātmaparicaya*, p. 111.

[6] *Sāhityera Swarūpa*, p. 49.

[7] *Reminiscences*, p. 8.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.* p. 112.

Over and above this aristocracy of taste, the progressive views were also subtly but surely penetrating in the family, and though the Poet inherited a rich traditional legacy his vision was never obscured by dead ceremonials and beliefs. As we gather from *Ātmaparicaya*, old mediaeval traditions were hardly the be-all and end-all of their culture which sought instead a natural and a more rounded development through a process that was more spontaneous than artificial.[10] Tagore's poetic mind hardly limited its range under influences that were cramping: he would not allow his soul to die under the deadweight of a sense of values that encouraged segregation and separatism. On the other hand, the beauty of the open sky, the murmur of leaves and the ripple of a tiny river: all reverberated within his passionate heart and he instantly responded to the call :

"Ai biswarachanāya bismayakatā āchey, chāridikei āchey anirbachaniyatā, tār sangey mishreta hotey pārini kono pauranik biswas, kono bishesh parbanbidhi. Āmār moner sangey abimishreta jog hate pareche ai jagater. Balyakal theke atinibiḍ bhābe ānanda payechi biswadrishe."[11]

His intercourse with the mighty world, full of wonders and thrills, of unknown mysteries and endless powers, was made more intense by the ecstatic absorption of the child who watched with a keen interest at the trees of his garden and at the ways of the various men coming to bathe in the tank. Tagore never got maternal caresses and "the rule of the slave dynasty at home"[13] drove him to utter loneliness, to a state where the play was bound to be inside his own

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[10] *Ātmaparicaya*, p. 113.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Jīvansmṛti*, p. 25.

[13] Referring ironically to the rule of the servants at home.

heart. He would gaze at the world beyond his reach. This craving for the limitless thing called the outside, of which flashes of sounds and scents used momentarily to come and touch him, lasted him his life time and though the 'chalk line' was wiped away the confining ring was still there within the heart of his heart. It was not merely a child's curiosity for a region unknown to him; it was an early sign in him of the great quest for the Infinite which dominates all his writings. Life of the world throbbed incessantly within his heart; "earth, water, foliage and sky, they all spoke to us and would not be diregarded." This early loneliness had its advantages; it taught him to develop within himself the truth of his own expreience[14] even when the experiences were mere ebullitions of emotions, mere whirlpools which revolved round and round themselves and could not be lived through as mere internal welling up and mere subjective excitement. His heart was his own and he was feasting on the joy of the internal equipment. The glimpse of Nature that he could catch would rush to meet him and would remain with him for a long time here after, as a fountain source of all revelation. This is what he writes in a letter to Andrews:

"I was very lonely—that was the chief feature of my childhood. From the very first time I can remember I was passionately fond of nature........Nature was a kind of loving companion always with me and was recreating to me some fresh beauty."[15]

Rabindranath would approach Nature like a beggar who at the palace door imagines unknown treasures to be held in the strong rooms, inaccessible to him. But Nature ever wanted to play with him through the bars with so many gestures. Again he writes in *Creative Unity* :

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[14] *Ātmaparicaya*, p. 115.

[15] Quoted by E. Rhys in *Rabindranath Tagore*. Cf. *Rachanavali* Vol. 17, p. 461.

"I remember when I was a child that a row of coconut trees by our garden wall, with their branches beckoning the rising sun on the horizon, gave me a companionship as living as I was myself. I know it was my imagination which transmuted the world around me into my own world—the imagination which seeks unity—which deals with it."[16]

This companionship with the universe that had an element profoundly akin to his own imaginative mind gave him an idea of the unison that vibrates in the eternal reality—a sympathy that tends towards a fuller realization of the infinite in his dramas. It was the preamble to the joy in the Infinite. But to the child sitting behind the bars, there was essentially an element of conflict in the craving for Nature; a conflict that showed its magic glory to young Amal—the lad in *Ḍākaghara* who constantly expected a communication from the outside world towards the fulfilment of his personality; it was this early initiation in the mysteries of Nature, in the cycle of seasons that fructify in such plays as *Śaradotsava* and *Ṛturaṅga* which abound with a realization of the various spirits that lie imbued in the treasure of the seasons rich with their extravagant gifts of life. The concept behind his dramas was not that of a vaguely spiritualised love of Nature (as in Yeats) or its grim reality or of a soft all-pervading atmosphere that exists behind the Sanskrit plays.[16a] It was a thoroughly humanised Nature in which Tagore had sought and discovered his own counterpart. His mind was full of the pleasure of an inner joy that emerged from the sanctuary of his own soul into the outer world whose mystery and vastness were perhaps emblematic of the Infinity:

"Āmi ki atmār madhye diye ki biswar madhye diye bismayaer anta dekhi nā. Āmi jaḍ nām diya, sashim nām

[16] P. 8.

[16a] *Kalidasa by* Sastri, Vol. 2, pp. 127.

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diya kono jinishke thelia rākhite pāri nai. Ai shimār madhye ai prathakhār madhye ananter je prakāsh, tahai āmār kache ashim bismayābaha."[17]

Or again, from his *Reminiscences*:

"Chelebelār dike jakhan tākāno jai takhan sabchaye ai kathātā money paḍey je jagat-tā o jivan-tā rahashye paripurna. Sarbatrai je ektā abhābaniya achey ebong kakhon je tāhār dekha paoa jaibe thikānā nai, ai kathātai pratidin money jāgita."[18]

This eagerness for the unknown world coupled with a certain aloofness from the 'grim' world awakened in him a thirst for the distant which soon combined with such a peculiar restlessness that he was easily led to an endless reverie. But the process did not last long because the primordial being in him was suffering, to use the words of Middleton Murry, "under the conflict of thought and emotion which is characteristic of the new development that his growing human consciousness was seeking. In fact, the conflict is the beginning of the selfconsciousness—the conflict between intellectual indulgence and emotional indulgence—though in the very primordial stage, the conflict and condition tend to be synomymous." The utterance of the whole experience which Tagore was then so anxiously seeking for was demanding "to be completed by utterance as whole as itself". Naturally enough this progress corresponds to the spiritual progress of innocence (see *Ghara O Bāhira* in *Jīvanasmṛti*) where Nature in trying to reassert control over precious faculties, gave birth to imagination. It was, therefore, that the intensity of feeling came, meaning the realisation of *his* being a separate being—leading thereafter to an intellectual and more objective indulgence of conceit that could not merely be a craving for the Infinite world but was the product, in its turn, of his baffled and

[17] *Ātmaparicaya.*

[18] P. 20, cf. Āmi Sudurer piyāshi.

defeated in his desire. It was not a state of realisation in that something which the boy sought for, but a kind of futility met after a serious and constant effort—he always imagined that he would be able some day to achieve the unattainable. It was not entirely a question of being deliberately psychological and so forth, for such a meditative nature was an inherent part of Tagore's genius. It was not always a subconscious self either; it was, on the contrary, a self that was gradually getting conscious of the external world and sought a harmony with it. And while Tagore's *upanayana* ceremony and his visit to the Himālayas had yielded him a new-born capacity to extricate himself from the state of mere emotional indulgence in his fleeting visions and vague premonitions, yet the inwardness which is characteristic of his later dramas grew, almost indirectly, with him and manifested itself in his recurring tendency to recline back on his own soul.

Apart from this, as Tagore has stated, one of the reasons for the deep individuality in his writings was the isolation of the Tagore household from the average Hindu society. The social ostracism of the Pirali Brahmanas, curiously enough, imparted to the Tagore household a queer aloofness though this was considered by many as the distinction of belonging to the elect. Hence the Tagores had hardly any occasion to imitate the mannerisms of contemporary Bengali society, and their last refuge had always to be their Palace at Jorasanko :

"Ai nirālāye ai paribārey je sātantro jegey uthechilo shey swābhābik. Tai āmāder Bhāsai ekta kichoo bhangi chilo kolkātār lokey jāke ishara kore bolto thākurbāḍir bhasā"[19]

But this did not mean that the Tagores were culturally stagnating; on the contrary, the atmosphere of their house was being nourished by the culture of both Eastern and

[19] Kavita, Poush.

Western thought. Kālidāsa and Shakespeare were being read with as much avidity as the works of Herbert Spencer and the Vedānta; while the Maharṣi, in spite of his so-called puritanic attitude to lite, was never against any amusement or gaiety being practised inside the palace walls. There is evidence that members of the Tagore household frequently invited the famous yatrawalas whose performances, then so much in vogue, were enjoyed by all. But the young boys were definitely forbidden to witness any such performances.[20] They could remain outside watching the grand preparations being made :

"But we children had no part in them and I managed to see only the preliminaries. The verandas would be full of the members of the company, the air full of tobaco smoke. There were the boys, long-haired, vith dark rings of weariness under their eyes and, young as they were, with the faces of grown men. Their lips were stained black with constant betel chewing. Their costumes and their paraphernalia were in painted tin boxes".[21]

But at night Tagore would be lifted away to the bedroom.

"Outside all tumult and shouting, outside flared the lighted chandaliers but in my room there was not a sound and a brass lamp burned low in its stand. Even in sleed I was dimly conscious of the crash of the symbals marking the rhythm of the dance".[22]

One day, however, the young boy to his immense delight was permitted to be present at such a show. The *Kathakas* too entered the palace and patronage was extended to musicians like Śrīkānta Sinha. On another occasion the entire hall of a certain theatre was reserved and even

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[20] *My Boyhood Days*, p. 21 et. seq.

[21] *Ibid.* p. 23.

[22] *Ibid.*

ladies attended the show.[23] The Maharsi also sanctioned the donation of a thousand rupees to a certain music-society founded by Jyotirindranath, and presented Rabindranath with a cheque for Rs. 500 when the latter sang him a song. But that the Maharṣi was against too much wild gaiety and would occasionally warn his children against any excesses being comitted in the name of amusement is evident from the letter that he addressed to Ganendranath when *Navanāṭaka* was being staged at the Jorasanko palace:

"Tomār natyashālār dwār utghātita haiachey, samabet bādya dwāra aneker hridaya nrittya kariāchey, kabitwa raser āswadaney anekey paritripti lābh kariachey. Nirdosh āmod āmader desher je akti abhāb tāhā ai prakar kramey kramey duribhut haibey ....Kintu ami snehapurvak tomākey sābdhān koritechi je ai proakār amod jena doshey parinata na hai. Sadbhāber sahit ai amodkey raksha kariley amāder deshey sabhyatar bridhi haibey, tāhār sandeha nai.[24]

Incidentally, however, the letter hints at one very interesting point—the degeneration that had set is some of the social amusements in Bengal. Here it may be stated that the Maharsi was right in being sceptical of the evil influences of some of the *yātrā* pieces and farces which were full of immense grossness and vulgarity. Girish Ghosh was also once forced to comment on the degradation that had crept in the *yātrā* shows.[25] In these circumstances, it would not be fair to accuse the Maharshi of a rigid puritanism as is done in certain quarters. Even *Ekai ki Boley Sabhyatā?* and *Buḍo Śāliker Ghare Roñ* are not plays which can be witnessed safely by young boys and impressionable youth. Bankimchandra, while commenting on

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[23] Abanindranath Tagore : *Gharoa.*

[24] Racanāvalī, Vol. XIII.

[25] His essay on *Yatra* in the last volume of the Basumati edition of his collected works.

Jyotirindranath's farces, also noticed this. Hence, it is a truism that pure, harmless means of amusement were lacking, and in Gunendranath the Tagores found a patron who by his "new ideas of festivity or frolick, theatrical or other entertainments"[26] kept the gay spirit alive. "I remember," writes Rabindranath, "how a burlesque composed by my elder brother was being rehearsed in my cousin's big drawing room......We could hear roars of laughter mixed with comic songs".[27] The magh festival furnished another opportunity for refined amusements as did the gatherings that were held occasionally at the Palace.[28]

It is then a mistake to say that Rabindranath grew in an atmosphere of rigid puritanism though the Maharshi took care to see that there were no laxity and slovenliness among his children and that they led an ordered and disciplined life. He did not however ask them to renounce all material pleasures though, as Jyotirindranath tells us in his *Reminiscences*, a strict code of social decorum was enforced and even when a play was staged or a dance organised, everybody had to be cautious that nothing indecent came in. Really speaking it was with the purpose of making his children sober and sensible that the Maharshi gave them a thorough footing in oriental learning though to Rabindranath its earliest appeal was through suggestion. The value, writes he, of suggestion,

"is not to be despised even by those who measure education in terms of gain or losses. These insist on trying to sum up the account and find exactly how much of the lesson imparted can be rendered up. But children and those who are not over-educated dwell in that primal paradise where men can come to know without fully comprehending

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[26] *Reminiscences*, p. 119.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Jyotirindranath : *Jīvansmṛti*, p. 72.

each step. And only when paradise is lost comes the evil day when everything must needs be understood. The road which leads to knowledge, without going through the dreary process of understanding: that is the royal road. If it is barred, though the world's marketing may yet go on as usual, the open sea and the mountain top cease to be possible of access."

The *gāyatrī* appealed to him not by its meaning which is difficult to understand but by its purely suggestive character, and tears flowed from his eyes. "The fact of the matter is that, " said Tagore," what is going on in the inner recesses of consciousness is not always known to the dweller on the surface."[29] When sometime later he started learning music, its main attraction to him was more suggestive than otherwise and its melody brought him the message of the Eternal, the Infinite. We find an echo of the same idea many a time in the series of plays beginning with *Śaradotsava* and the true nature of their appeal is expressed with singular clarity in the prologue to *Phālgunī* :

"Jā rachanā korechō tār artha kī kīchu granān kartev-pārbo ?

Nā Māhārāj, rachanā to arthagrahan karbār jonye nai.

Tabe ?

Śai rachanākei grahan karbār joneye. Āmi to bolechi āmār ai sab jiniś banśir mato, bojbār jonye nai, bajbār jonye."

The appeal which the outerworld sends to Amala in *Dākaghara*, to the group of children in *Śaradotsava*, to the Rājā in *Phālguni* is not through dull cold reason, through the faculty of understanding; it is almost entirely through vague suggestions, through a willing suspense of 'the calculating organ.' The value of suggestion to this boy growing in a house pervaded with literary atmosphere was bound to be

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[29] *Reminiscences*, p. 75 *et seq*.

immensely great and it is known how an early appreciation of the *Cloud Messneger* or of the *Old Curiosity Shop* was through the same medium that would transfer him to his own world of imagination. With the vague ideas that he could conjure up he spun a variously coloured gossamer. The cosmopolitan atmosphere of the Tagore household allowed no complexes to develop here. Finally it was his imagination which could transmute the whole world around him into *his* world by seeking to establish an unison with it. But the range of his experience was even then limited as he had seen only a minute fraction of the world on which he could build up a whole series of subjective excitement. These were, as said before, mere ebullitions of emotions, and his delight then consisted considerably in the yet greater awakening of his emotions. To free his soul from its own domain and to diffuse it in the greater world were only erst while opportunities which appeared more grandly later on when a couple of years after he was sent to Europe.

It is against such a panorama that Tagore the poet entered into a conflict for form with Tagore the dramatist and then in a lesser degree with Tagore the novelist. The whole period from *Banaphlua* to *Sandhyāsangīta* or perhaps *Prabhātasangita* can easily be identified with Tagore's severe search for a literary form which he thought would suit his genius best. Which would be the most suitable vehicle for the expression of his ideas—narrative-poetry, drama novel or the lyric ? "As a coquettish lady" "Tagore tried" to please all her lovers and is afraid to lose a single one"[30]. He, of course, started his literary career with narrative poem and was then hardly conscious of his potential capacity as a lyric poet. *Banaphūla* and *Kavikāhinī* easily belong to this category to be followed in quick succession by *Vālmiki-pratibhā* which is a musical play and *Rudracānda* which is a drama. The first-named (showing traces of

[30] Roy, *op. cit.* p. 46.

Śākuntala) has as its pivot a young girl growing in the seclusion of a mountain and ultimately ending her life with suicide. What appears pertinent is that here Tagore's imagination has not yet acquired genuine creative power but spent itself weaving fanciful embroidery round themes which he then found congenial. Yet Tagore's philosophy in life is inherent therein in the more distant from of a quest for a harmony between love and marriage and between the conflict that develops between their pressing demands—that of marriage being bound within a narrow range, that of love being limitless. Around this collision also develops the clash between man and nature and then its subsequent blending, which as in the laster season-plays, ends with Man's mangificent fulfilment.[31]

Kavikāhinī (1878) carries the theme a step forward. About it Tagore writes :

"'The poem belongs to that period of life when the poet had not acquired enough familiarity with the real world and had an exaggerated views of the vague shadows of his own mind. Therefore, its hero is a poet. And this poet is not a reflection of the writer's real personality but of what he himself wishes to be and appear to others. Perhaps not exactly what he wishes, but what he ought to wish, or rather that he would be what people would nod approval to and say—yes here's a poet indeed."[31a]

It may not be, as Tagore has said, the complete reflection of the writer's real being, but since it was a dramatic poem, there was in it at least on the dramatic side, what Murry has called, an incomplete self-indentification with the figures and the process of the drama[32]. But consider-

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[31] See Bisi : *Rabindrakavya Nirjhar*, p. 47 et. seq.
My rendering

[31a] *Shakespeare*, p. 288. In another way the same thing is said when Tagore writes : Bhālo natyakavya lekhaker āmtaprakriti o bāhirer mānabprakriti amon abichinna aikya rak ha kariya milita hai je ubhayake swatantra kora dushadhya. See Mukerji: *Rabindrajivani*, new edition, Vol. 1. p. 252.

ing the repeated appearance of the poet in the plays of Rabindranath, both as an ideal personality and as a detached observer, it may be contested that in *Kavikāhinī* the faculties of the poet have not yet been differentiated and the minor intensities are prefigurative of an all-comprehensing intensity that marks the dramatic poet. In *Kavikāhinī* it is the intensity of the working out of the conceits which when expanded into the intensity of the working out of the real being leads to the dramatic[32a]. From the other point of view as well, the fact that the poet's real being does not see *complete* expression only shows that Tagore in his dramatic poem had not yet been able to make Thought and Feeling coalesce[33] the same way as in *Phālgunī*, for example, and which is, creatively considered, the prime essential of the dramatic. It is suggestive that Rabindranath's self-identification with the creatures of his imagination and of the search for personality of his characters with *his own*, see here only a beginning however faint it might be. "It is in reference to that condition", writes Middleton Murry,

> "that we are to distinguish between the poet and the dramatist: the poet being the man in imaginative condition of utterance from his whole being, the dramatist the same man in the same condition but submissive to the necessities of the fiction which his power of imagination has generated or re-animated. A two-fold submissiveness, therefore: the one directed inwards towards the living whole of experience gathered up in the poet, the other turned, outwards towards the fiction which is being transformed into an articulation of that experience: a sort of systole and diastole which we may believe to be essential to the complete imaginative act. Or rather a sort of creative tension in which, at any given moment, there may be a preponderance of one emotion over the other: for many causes. But of one the effects are sometimes obvious: an inability completely to transform the fiction

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[32a] Hegel in *Philosophy of Fine Art*, Vol. 4 makes such a distinction between the sources of the poetic and the dramatic urge. Munro: *Introduction to the Arts* makes a slightly different interpretation.

[33] *Ibid.*

into an articulation of the poet's experience, so that the poet cannot be spontaneous through the character, but is spontaneous on behalf of the character. This inability may arise either through a defect in the poet, or defect in his material: either through an insufficient power of self-identification in the poet, or an insufficient verisimilitude in his plot and characters."[34]

It should not then be difficult to agree with Pramathanath Bisi in his estimate of the extent in which the poet in Tagore appears in *Kavikahinī* [35] or to assert, in a different way, that the 'poet' in *Rudracānda* is an attempt at this transformation of the poet's experience into the existence of a fictional character. The creative tension is appearent in both cases—a tension which seeks a fictional relief in the discovery by the Sannyasi of his soul in *Prakṛtira Pratiśodha*. *Rudrācānda's* hero proclaims almost with a peculiar agreement with Tagore:

"Within the infinite body is an ocean of life; the waves of an illimitable passion barricaded are as within a small prison. Its arrested currents; O Friend, would like to break this body and flood this universe. Head the Infinite sky been the playground of this life, and the unnumbered stars its plaything, had the horizons not imprisoned the unending sky, and had Nature like a mother revealed tome the eternal records of time, this untamed young would have drunk delight at her breast and filled the places with delirious songs of joy".

It is not difficult to discover Rabindranath the poet in this, and the illimitable passion which bursts with intensity in the lyrics called *Heartwilderness* is gathered here and controlled by the imaginative passion of the drama itself. The successive appearance in later plays of the poet or in a different shape of *Ṭhākuradādā* or *Dādāṭhākura* only reveals that the conflict between the poet and dramatist in Rabindranath was an abiding one—the temporary supremacy of the one over the other leading him to one form of literary expression or the other. Rabindranath has almost accepted this view when he writes:

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[34] *Shakespeare*, p. 284.
[35] *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

"I do not want to disappoint any of my muses. But that increases the work and in the long run I cannot master one completely and fully. When I compose songs I feel thatI ought to stick to it. When I am engaged in writing a play I am so intoxicated with the subject that I begin to feel that I should devote my whole life in this pursuit."[36]

What a statement, and what an attempt to be both the spectator and the creator of his characters: Tagore's preface to a later play *Mālinī* only strengthens the view.

The conflict in him germinated in *Kavikāhinī* in another shape. As Pramathanath Bisi has explained, the poem has three parts:

"Pratham angshey mānabhārjita prakriti; dwitiya angshey mānab Nalini; tritiya angshey manaber sattai sajibatar, samridhatar prakriti".[37]

These three phases provide almost the fulcrum to the lever of Rabindranath's dramatic works as well as the key to his concept of tragedy. Bisi then asks:

"Samagra Rabindrakavyero ki ai tin bhāg nai ? Thanhār pratham bayasher kavyer pradhān nayak prakriti; madhyajivaner kavyer pradhān nayak mānush; sesh bayasher kavyer pradhān nayak nichak manusho nai, nichok prakriti-o nai; manush o prakritir akta mahhatar apurva samanya".[37]

It may be suggested that this grouping is applicable even to Rabindranath's dramas; what is more relevant here is that the movement from one state of mind to another, and perhaps from one range of feeling to another, demands not merely a completely imaginative abandon in that particular state but also an element of discontent, of pain which makes the poet move out of one orbit into another. It may be that at times the sheer intensity of too much feeling or even, of passion may produce an anguish of pain; and then the pain is transferred to a dramatic character at whose sadness the poet delights by seeking indirectly his

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[36] Roy, *op. cit.*

[37] Bisi, *op cit.*, p. 62.

purgation therein. In all artistic endeavour, as a scholar of aesthetic has remarked, there is of course an element of conflict "which in emotion warns of unstable equilibrium, and for which emotion, emergency action is necessary for a return to equilibrium"[38]; but when the pain is very intense (as it was in the *Sandhyāsaṅgīta* group of poems) the artist must objectify the feeling by means of a craft that admits such objectification.[39] Apart from this, with Tagore there was another kind of discontent which soon developed into pain. It is described by him thus:

"Jakhan jetā likhitechilam, takhan saitakei parinām boliya money koritechilam......kintu aj janiachi, she-shakal lekhā upalaksha mātra; tāhāra je anagatake gadia tulite chey, she anagatake taharao chene na."[40]

Who knows if the spirit of *Jīvanadevatā* is not tempered witn this conflict between the emotional state of world in which the poet exists for a period, and the new state in which he enters thereafter? The *Jīvanadevatā* concept will, in that case, provide at best an unifying factor to the inner strain of conflict whose existence Rabindranath admits:

"Jato etā agiye challo tatoi purvajivaner sangey ashanna jivaner akta bichched dekha ditey laglo".[41]

Though the evolution of the *Jīvanadevatā* concept has here synchronised with the search of the poet's religion,[42] yet it is beyond doubt that, Rabindranath always felt a conflict between one peoetic mood and another—a conflict which made him develop so many of his lyrics into dramas, and then to discover in moments of intense lyric rapture a dramatic conflict which would only be fore-

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[38] M. C. Nahm: *Aesthetic Experience and Its presuppositions*, p. 476.

[39] Reid: *Philosophy of Aesthetic*, p. 227.

[40] *Ātmaparichaya*, p. 3.

[41] *Ibid.*, p, 56.

[42] In *Religion of Man*.

shadowed in the lyric. The consecutive moments of lyric flight soon become the smaller dots in the big locus of Tagore's gradual unfolding of his religion—an unfolding which is instinct with a 'deeper drama of the soul' which, ever as usal, tries to discover its roots in historical reality.[43] The vital moments which can be read in the self-revelation of the lyrics then jostle with each other till they are plucked out as it were (to use a phrase from C. H. Herford) to be transplanted in the more legitimate organism of the drama, where the play of an eager intellct allows the feelings to be (what Brooks and Heilman call) 'externalised in conduct. Such was to an extent the case with Browning[44], with Shelley[45], and with Arnold when he wrote his *Merope*[46]; but since with Tagore the gradual disapperance of the plot interest and the increasing emphasis on the "incidents of the development of the soul" had come in to tune with the lyrical bent of the Bengali mind, his plays were comparably more successful than those of many other lyric poets who turned to the drama.

The problem of Tagore's own personal development thus appears through the little crises in the lyrics themselves[47] that wait to be more congenial to his art when they are projected upon some other mind to be tinged with their feelings and thoughts. He told the experience of his lyrics in his dramas; he uttered his own conviction most easily and fairly effectively through alien lips. For a like reason, as his first and second essays in *Atmaparichaya* would reveal, he longed to survey the slow continuities of lyric moments from the standpoint, first, of the given moment

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[43] Cf. Bisesh Manusher Jivaney . . . .etc. *Rabi-rasmi*, Vol. 1. p. 81, new edition.

[44] Herford : *Browning*, p. 38 *et seq.*

[45] Carl Grabo : *Prometheus Unbound* (*A Study*).

[46] Trilling : *Mathew Arnold*

[47] Compare the two stanzas quoted in *Ātmaparichaya*.

and then, of a given state of mind, under the condition and perspective of illusion which this process imposed. But these conditions are more satisfied in the drama which directly imitates action, and were more successful in the dramatic pattern which Tagore employed, because the action was focussed in a particular mind, moment or even thought, and therefore Tagore's lyric genius found a complementary and effective outlet in the wealth of implicit drama in which he concentrated these salient moments tense with the memory of a personal quest. The insuppressible alertness and enterprise of his own mind tells upon his portrayal of these intense moments.

But such a sense of fellowness as appears in the drama had, of course, its counterpart in Rabindranath's dramatic character following him in his sadness which grew only to an extent on a sense of aloneness which Tagore experienced in his childhood. The fact is that, apart from a kind of enjoyment in the spectacle of suffering of others, Tagore himself was going through a period of sadness which accompanies and follows the birth of a new consciousness. The temporary supremacy of passion and of emotion can but suffer a sevre check at the hands of a deep self-analysis and thought which attend the emergence of a more receptive mind, and the new capacity for different kinds of interest may soon see an outlet in drama. In the poems of this period we note a preponderance of tragic themes like frailty of beauty and goodness, the insensate might of material forces—"these ever-grosing subjects expressed now in plaintive monodies of despair, now in the weary accents of pessimism." The inconsistency was first between the passionate world of his inner mind and the outer world, and then between his outer life and his failure to grasp it, which in a way sought to fill in the gap between reality and imagination. It is possibly with a view to clearing his mind from the accretions of youthful fancy that he began to experiment later on

with the art of the novel where, as in the drama, he imposed a control over his imagination and guided it along a logical line of development. There was, moreover, as in *Kavikāhinī*, an attempt to discover the particular *milieu* in which his mind might find its adequate medium for complete expression. *Kavikāhinī* symbolises these two trends:

> "Ai kavyer moulik bedanā kavir atriptitey, kintu antim bedanā byaktigata kshetra uttirna haiā mānab samājer dukhe artanādshil."[48]

The reason for this is ascribed by Pramathanath Bisi to the poet's constant application of a personal standard of values, where everything is intensely subjective, and being so, refuses to view the real life. But the subject matter in all representative art must always be based on a representation of real life, and about *Sandhyāsangīta* Rabindranath had said that "these poems had *nothing*[48a] of the solidity of the real world". And then, once the values of personal life are changed into the values of the real world, to be transformed again into the values embodied in the play, we get a successful drama. Tagore's search for, and ultimate expression of, an important part of his creative self in the drama show how he entered into a conflict and then sought to fuse his 'own' world into the 'real world' of his plays.

Bhagnahṛdaya is a dramatic poem which marks such a difficult mental crisis. As Tagore writes in his preface to it.

> "Ai kavyatike keha jena nātak mone nā karen. Nātak phuler gāch. Thatey phul photey batey, kintu shei sange mul, kando, sākhā, patra amon ki kāntāti parjanta thākā chai. Bartaman kavyati phuler mālā, ihate kebal phulguli matra samagraha karā haiache."[49]

Pervading the story is the development of an emotion intensely felt, and there is just the slenderest attempt

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[48] Bisi, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
[48a] My italics
[49] Preface to *Bhangahridaya*, Rachanavali, Vol. 1.

to present it objectively through a story. This emotion, in these early years, leans towards tragedy that has its basis in the discrepancy between his life and art, and continued to be such as to prevent the absolute expression of his Self through the medium of his art; *Vālmīki-pratibhā*, *Rudra-cānda*, *Kalmrigaya* and *Nalinī* seek some emergence from what Brajendranath Seal had called "poetic henotheism" under the influence of which "the entire universe assumes the tone of the poet's world giving rise to a kind of hallucination". *Bhagnahṛdaya* belongs, as Pramathanath Bisi rightly believes[50], to be the borderline of lyric and drama; its internal features are lyrical while its external shape is dramatic. Dramatic poetry, lyricism and drama combine together to make *Bhagnahṛdaya* whose importance Tagore stressed when he wrote so much about it in his *R mis-cences*.

It must at the same time be remembered that *Bhagnahṛdaya* was composed while Rabindranath was in England. Before this visit the poet's range of experience was definitely limited and the minute fraction of the world which he had seen had helped him build up only a small series of subjective excitements. The sojurn in Europe, though intended to help Tagore launch a successful career either as a barrister or as a member of the Civil Service[51], w.s however productive of an altogether different result. Truly speaking, his enforced trip to England was of the nature of an exile intended to curb the easiness with which he had taken his education at school; but very soon, the visit yielded a new fruit in the shape of a fresh range of vision that flashed across the poet when he was hovering between adolescence and youth. This borderland age, wrote Rabindranath.

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[50] Bisi, *op. cit.* p. 85.
[51] *Atmaparichaya*, p. 88.

"is not illumined with the direct rays of truth--its reflection is seen here and there and the rest is shadow. And like twilight shades, its imaginings are long drawn and vague, making the real world look like a world of fantasy. The curious part of it is that not only was I eighteen but everybody around me seems to be eighteen likewise: and we all flitted round it in the same baseless, substanceless world of imagination where even the most intense joys and sorrows seemed like the joys and sorrows of dreamland. There being nothing real to weigh them against, the trivial did duty for the great."[52]

That at this age, as Thompson said, Tagore "returned to India apparently bringing little from his visit" is incorrect; on the contrary, Tagore came back with a new capacity to cross the limits of the monotonous existence of urban Bengali life and to transcend all obstacles. The play of his desires, intensified and variegated by the romantic fervour of the English poetry he read there, enabled him to search for a differentiation between the various functions of the mind and the various modes of expression. The impetuosity of passion in the poet then flooded him with a swelling energy; and the subsequent transition from a world of pure sensory delight, illumined with an occasioal faint ray of consciousness, to a realm of intensely passionate delight in the tumultuous throbbing of the heart coupled with a casual, a yet greater realisation of his *being* is indeed a milestone in the road to his mental evolution. And as hinted earlier, from *Sandhyāsaṅgīta* to *Prabhātasaṅgīta* is the measure of the distance that his mind had travelled; from the half-light half-darkness of the evening to the glorious morning illumined with sun's first rays.

Bhagnahṛdaya then clearly initiates and anticipates the changed outlook of Tagore. He intuitively realised, as he said in a contemporary essay (entitled '*Why the Bengalis are not poets*?'), that "abstract imagination by itself could not make a poet. There must be intellect and selec-

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52 *Reminiscenses.*

tive judgement to direct imagination to the right channel". Thus, in effect, he distinguished between imagination and what Coleridge referred to as the esemplastic power, the power which unifies and moulds. But then, according to Tagore's own confession, this desire to mould combined with the desire for a story, though the persons appearing in a dramatic poem can hardly transgress the deep subjective impress of the poet's own personality. To distance the personality, and then to view it with detachment as a spectator may be the uncoscious urge behind the use of such a medium as is *Bhagnahṛdaya*; it is also possible that it is the outcome of the English Romantic poetry which had then saturated the Bengali mind.[53] Whatever it be, the fact remains that *Bhagnahṛdaya* has a tragic note, and the slenderness of the plot, as in Tagore's later plays, is more than well-compensatec by the profusion of songs. In technique *Bhagnahṛdaya* may anticipate *Māyār Khélā*, though the way the action is here held up by lyricism may easily show the way to plays like *Śaradotsava*, *Acalāyatana* and others. Yet, from a closer view, it is apparent that there is a note of dissatisfaction in the poem—a dissatisfaction that is due to an absence both of the intensification of the human emotion and of a successful solution of the problem of personality. In *Kavikāhinī* the fulfilment is discovered in the Himālayas; here there is hardly any scope for such fruition. The many different people in him demand a better justice than what can be given in a lyrical poem[54] and Tagore's 'heartwilderness' seems to be a detriment to it.

The consequence was a great measure of sadness and pessimism caused by Tagore's failure to sift his personal

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[53] Not that some of the elements of romance were not present in the earlier Bengali poetry. What it exactly got from the English Romantic poetry has been stated by Dasgupta : *Western Influence in Bengali Poetry*.

[54] Cf. Macneice : "Drama offers him (the poet) neededchange from the single voince. In drama he can do justice to the many different people within him", quoted in *Language of Tragedy*, p. 351.

mood in its essential reality out of the overgrowths of dreams, fancies and sentiments. Biswapati Choudhury believes that there was in Tagore an unconscious conflict between the range of enjoyment and feeling and that of thought, while again, the latter sought to be transformed into an actual field of experience.[55] To strike a balance between feeling, thought and experience can be the product of a highly developed mind, while *Sandhyāsangīta* poems had "nothing of the solidity of the real world" in them. To a large extent this was undoubtedly due to an absence of fundamental experience which becomes a definite hindrance when poetry, instead of reverting to a consecrated past, seeks mainly to be a lyrical expression of the self. Tagore then sought to travel in a new direction, to discover a fresh range of experience through the beings of his dramatic characters where as an aesthetician says, "we see reality not more vividly but more comprehensively." The perspective before a dramatic artist is a "perspective which results in a subtle and indiscriminate selection of what is important for the theme of a drama." The impersonal and abstract pain of *Sandhyāsangīta*[56] is the product of a frustration in the world as Tagore *thought it was*, and then this thought of the world recoield back to compel him to secure the experience of the world as *he thought it was*. There is in this an apparent conflict—a field of uneasiness and anxiety[57] which later on, in *Chahi O Gān*, received a more balanced expression.

What is important here is that underlying the occasional joyousness of his personal life, there is in the subconscious self a variety of contradictory feelings whose synthetic expression is possible only in drama which admits such various types of feelings in conflict with themselves or thought or even experience. The perception, as Nahm

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[55] *Kavyey Rabindranath*, p. 79.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

says,[58] is individual; the characters there grow out of the poet's individuality into their own individuality and the most successful drama is that where, as in *Dākaghara*, we have "a purified and essential vision of unified persons and actions"[59]. The action is the field of experience, whether in the world of thought or that of deed. Drama provides Tagore with that special field of experience where (as Pramathanath Bisi says) he had no more to draw exclusively upon his own range of feeling but could conveniently use the broader range of his character's field or experience.[60] A handy plot only facilitated the employment of the dramatic medium in which, for a time, Tagore progressed quicker, than in the lyrics.[61]

Perhaps this mood of tragic gloom and pessimism which he was working off in his poems and novels led him to examine the nature of tragedy in a critical essay of high significance. In this essay he explained that tragedy does not need to depend on the death of the hero or the heroine. The essence of tragedy, he then thought, is frustration—the irremovable discrepancy between endeavour and attainment. He showed this by a critical analysis of Bankimchandra's *Viṣabṛkṣa* which only points, though vaguely, the way to the concept of tragedy underlying *Prakṛtira Pratiśodha*. The early playlets reveal unmistakably the nature and trend of Rabindranath's dramatic genius. The dramatic atmosphere at Jorasanko only precipitated the development.[62]

It is against such a background of creative turmoil that Rabindranath's early playlets have to be finally seen. For, the pain that he felt during the change from subjective

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[58] Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

[59] Review in the *New Statesman and the Nation.*

[60] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

[61] Bissi, *op. cit.* pp. 103-4.

[62] *Jivansmrti*, pp. 207-8.

experience to objective thought[63] created a particularly dramatic mood when his submerged inner self, secure till this time in the nebula of internal welling up, struggled to release itself from its bondage and emerge in the open. "This over-rush and conflict of these inner powers," writes Das Gupta, "can never realise their end until they are differentiated and strengthened and until consciousness grows of the objective world of reality through which passions are to manifest themselves."[64] Rabindranath experienced for the first time the pain of discord particularly when he discovered that he could not strike the balance between the peculiarly 'ringed-in seclusion' and the diversity of the real world of men and material. It was in this mood of conflict and discovery that humanity entered into the intellectual horizon of Tagore developing at last a broad kinship with the Universe which is an integral part of the cosmos. The poet's discovery of himself in a crowd of men (as in *Prakṛtira Pratiśodha*) has been more than anticipated in such playlets as *Rudracānda*, *Kalamṛgaya*, *Māyār Khélā*.

Tagore's earliest play *Rudracānda* appeared in print in 1881 and has not been reprinted except in the *Racanāvalī* edition. It consists of eight hundred lines, in fourteen scenes and shows one of the earliest traces in Tagore of the Elizabethan dramatic influence. The theme is essentially that of a revenge-play where Rudracānda seeks vengeance against Pṛthvirāja. But the play is also aflame with the sparks of the poet's own soul whose distant counter part can surely be discovered in Cāndakavi. Amiyā too is dramatically speaking a sustained attempt of the poet in Tagore to view the world of men and manners and the rebuff that she gets from humanity (Scene 5) may to an extent be suggestive of the repulsion that Rabindranath

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[63] *Reminiscences*.

[64] *Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, Tagore Birthday Number.

had himself received when he found the 'chalk-line' making a distinct barrier. No wonder then that Rudracānda's hatred of the city people is not merely a hatred of Pṛthvīrāja encroaching on his forest home, but an attempt of the poet to seek a peculiar self-obliteration. The essay on the *Message of the Forest* in *Creative Unity* clearly culminates in Tagore's fondness of the forest.

Looked from another point of view *Rudracānda* posits the trend of Tagore's future dramatic activity. In Rudra's tumultuous range of revenge can be anticipated the more unified and purposeful wrath of King Vikram while in his attempt to keep himself in seclusion to nurture his zeal can be sensed the seclusion in which the Sannyasi in *Prakṛtir Pratiśodha* hurled himself for a while. Rudracānda's towering spirit of revemge makes him desert his daughter temporarily to return to her as the Sannyasi returned to the orphan girl. In addition to his, there runs across the play an element of the nationalistic fervour which had then swept over the whole of Bengal and particularly the plays of Jyotirindranath. When getting a chance to wreak vengeance in conspiracy with Muhammad Ghori, *Rudracānda* spurned the idea as anti-national though the fire of hatered against Pṛthvīrāja had not in the least abated. Moreover, the generosity, which Subodh Sengupta feels should exist in the important personages of a revenge-play, has been clearly instilled in Chāndkavi who grants a new lease of life to Rudracānda and thereby directly allows the action of the play to continue while it had almost come to an end. Considering the age of Tagore when he wrote *Rudracānda*, the plot though taken from history, can be said to be well-managed; and if the play has become melodramatic, it is because it lacks concentration and the crisis has been too recklessly thrown away. Dramatic suspense, in spite of a wail, is still there and we like to know whether Rudracaṇḍa was successful in his objective. Rudracanda's

opening soliloquy and asides reveal that Tagore was working on the Elizabethan model. The conflict between Cāndakavi and Rudracānda has not been based on sufficient motivation while the two deaths and the sudden mytification in the end are absolutely unwarranted. Yet, the presence of a poet and his admirer in the play are suggestive of the fact that Tagore's being is fundamentally undivided at this stage though he is making efforts towards the utterance both of thought and emotion in a way where the all-comprensive intensity of poetic feeling receives a dramatic expression. The dialogues in *Rudracānda* remain instinct with this endeavour and freely lapse from lyric to dramatic poetry and vice versa.

From *Vālmīki-pratibha* to *Māyār Khēlā* is, according to Tagore, almost a straight development. When his poetic soul was undergoing a deep agitation in tne region of imagination human values were creeping into them transforming everything into the dramatic. Tagore writes:

"A time had come when the dramatic was peeping into the lyric frame of my mind. I had just then crossed the gates of the world and had put my feet inside the inner chambers; the tapestry web of human relationship was then of considerable curiosity to me.[65]

He says again in his preface to *Prakṛtira Pratiśodha*:

"Tar parer abasthaya maner madhye mānusher sparsha laglo, bairer haoai janla khule galo, utshuk moner kāce prithivir drisha khandakhanda chalachabir mato dekha dite laglo. Guhacharer man takhan jhunklo lokalayer dike. Takhano bairer jagat sampurna mukta hote pare ni ābeger bāspapunja theke. Tabu dushapner mato āpnār bandanjal chendbar janya jege uthlo balaker āgraha. Ai samaikar rachana chabi o gan. Lekhanir ai nutan bahirmukhi prabitti takhan kebal bhabakatar aspashtatār madhye bandhan swikār karce na. Bedaner bhitar diya bhabprakāsher prayashe je shranta, kalpanār

[65] Preface to *Valmiki-prativa* in Rachanāvali, Vol. 1, my rendering.

pathe sristi karbār dike padeche tar jhonk. Ai pathe tār pratham dwār kulechilo valmiki-prativai."[66]

In the unsettled state of a child's primeval being the contact with Man created a new awareness and Tagore realised through an anguish that his own being was more vitally important than the glass on which he had reflected himself. To counteract this, as it were, he sought reflection of his personality on the wide panorama of the world whose pageant of men and women gave him a revelation of human values which almost instantaneously collided with each other. That the 'faculty of many-sideness' which then possessed him should clash with itself was an essential feature of Tagore's restless genius and the emergence[67] that he found in poetry, tried for an outlet in another shape. Moreover as he writes in his Reminiscences, while composing *Chabi O Gāna* which "breaks into the first dramatic period" he "was getting more concrete in my subject". "But I was hazy and emotional and my subject uncertain. I was no longer confined to my own feelings but the outside world began to attract me."[68] To be concrete then is a distinctive characteristic of this period and no where else is it possible to be the more so than, as S. Alexander says, in the drama. *Vālmīki-pratibhā*, coming between *Chabi O Gāna* and *Koḍi O Kamala*, clearly seeks "to get out of the subjective world of one's mood and moodiness",[69] through a medium where the poet makes himself a subject in whose search for the real self can clearly be detected a distancing that appears strange and wonderful. There is, moreover, an imaginative self-identification with the character in whose conflict lies dormant, and then develops, the true humanity which we know was then unknown to

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Thompson, *op, cit.*, p. 50.

[68] *Reminiscences.*

[69] Quoted in Thompson, *op. cit.* p. 62.

Rabindranath himself. The *vividness* of the drama removed the *vagueness* of the earlier state and the contact of the real life, when aesthetically selected and expressed, gave birth not to lyrics but to dramatic poems and dramas. Of course "the selection in this case is determined both by the important and essential things of universal life and by the aesthetic need of roundness and completeness of vision."[70] This gives to the dramas a "unity. . . . that belongs to the drama of life." *Vālmīki-pratibhā, Prakṛtira Pratiśodha* and *Māyār Khelā* attempt to catch this drama for us.

In this conflict, music had its part to play as well. "Music may be," as a critic says.

> "a revelation like drama of the human values and their working out but transformed by relation to musical sound and their construction. Again as drama both intesifies and selects what is essential in human experience, so it seems likely that in great music we have both intensification and selection of what is essential . . . . . . In its own special way music *seems* to reveal something which *feels* very like the 'essential' or the 'universal' of the great drama"[71]

This is specially true of the European music which "tends to give direct expression to emotion"[72] whose rise and fall in the drama can as well be inflected with tune, At least, this is what Rabindranath discovered in Herbert Spencer's *Essay on Music* and the rise and fall of passion has in *Vālmīki-pratibhā* been associated with the various *rāgas* and *rāgiṇīs* of Indian music. Moreover, *Vālmikī-pratibhā* is one of those very early plays of Tagore where he seems to be aware of an eastern dramatic tradition and the slight use of the *Kathakathā* technique is deeply suggestive of the inner bent of his mind. Even in music he tried to mingle Eastern and Western styles; "from this mixed

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[70] *Op. cit.* p. 278.

[71] *Op. cit.* pp. 280-81.

[72] *Rolland and Tagore* by Krishna Kripalani.

cultivation," writes he, "of foreign and native melody was born the *Vālmīki-pratibhā*". "The tunes in this musical drama are mostly Indian, but they have been dragged out of their classic dignity; that which soared in the sky was taught to run on earth. Those who have heard and seen it performed will, I trust, agree that the harnessing of the Indian melodic modes to the service of the drama has proved neither derogatory nor futile." "This conjunction" which is the "only special feature of *Vālmīki-pratibhā*" has come to be ignored while too much emphasis has been laid on the operatic nature of the play, in spite of Tagore's clear statement to the contrary. What is significant here is that the musical inflexion which Tagore now considers necessary for drama later on develops into dance-rhythms that accompany these inflexions.

Without this music *Vālmīki-pratibhā* can hardly be relished. Tagore even prefaced it once by three sentences deprecating any attempt to read it as a poem, apart from its music. But he is confident that the play is primarily dramatic[73] and its music hardly gains the supremacy over it. To be consciously dramatic seems to be the urge behind the play while Tagore hardly knows that there is a subtle reason behind his selection of the Valmiki episode. Chief of a robber band, Valmiki goes out a-hunting in the forest and catches a girl to be sacrificed at the altar of *Kālī*. But while the other robbers make merry with the captive, Vālmīki's soul suffers a severe unrest:

"A kamon holo man āmār.
Ki bhāv a je kichu bujhitey pariney,"[75]

and it dawns on him that to sacrifice human beings is a sin:

"A sab kāj ār nā, a pāp ār nā."[76]

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[73] Rachanāvali, Vol. 1. *op. cit.*

[74] *Reminiscences.*

[75] Rachanāvali, Vol. 1. p. 212.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

Immediately after develops the nascent conflict in him between his true nature as a man and the fact of his being a robber, where he had subdued his real self. His natural awareness of pity which had been smothered before becomes intense when he proclaims:

"Nayane jharichey bāri, a ki mā sahitey pāri ?"[77]

His inner being is shaking and he soon discovers the whole world enthralled with a magnificent glamour and significance. The reaction against his previous state comes from inside, is stimulated during the course of a few hours and terminates with his abandoning of the bow and the arrow. He has no right, as Aparna said later, to destroy life which he cannot create. A futility seizes the robber chieftain:

"Jibanaer kichu holo nā hai......
Gahaney gahaney kato ār bhramibo nirāshār a āndhārey
Pāri nāgo, pāri nā ār."[78]

The last two lines seem to echo the wail of Rabindranath himself made later in *Prabhāta-sangīta*:

"There is a vast forest named the heart
Limitless on all sides—
Here I lost mo way."[79]

This may as well be suggestive of a deep introspective sorrow that clearly foreshadows the sorrow in Rabindranath himself—a sorrow which, as already suggested, would help him emerge out of his own being into the world. The contact of man hastened the incipient progress just as it does in Valmiki who immediately after discovers poetry in the world when he chants the world's first poem. His entire soul was then illumined with an all-pervading light:

"Ghor andhakār mājne a ki jyoti bhār".[80]

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77 *Ibid.*, p. 216.

78 *Ibid.*, p. 221.

79 Quoted by Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

80 *Op. cit.* p. 222.

It is indeed the mood of self-discovery, of the realisation of his personality which was till now jaded by the superficial attractions of a robber's life. Rabindranath anmits this when he writes :

> "Vālmikār-prativātey dashyur mirmamatīkey bhed korey uchashita holo tār antarguḍ karunā. Aitai chilo tār swabhābik mamatwa, jetā dhākā porechilo tār abhyasher kathoratai. Akdin dwando ghatlo, bhitarkār mānush hatath ālo bairey."[81]

Who knows if this discovery by Vālmīki of his soul is in a way the revelation by Rabindranath of his own ? It is at least evident that here for the first time Rabindranath sees the true emergence of his dramatic genius, particularly at a time when it was undergoing a tremendous upheavel in the poetic field. The poet in Rabindranath suddenly saw the dramatist in himself just as the robber in Valmiki saw the poet in himself ; and *Vālmīki-pratibhā* fructifies a long struggle to be more objective than it was possible in the lyric. It is therefore a mistake to say that in *Vālmīki-pratibhā* there is no marked development in thought; on the contrary, it contains the earliest germ of Tagore's thought which later fructified in *Prakṛtira Pratiśodha* and *Māyār Khēlā*.[82]

From the point of view of technique, as a lyrical drama it achieves a high degree of success in that it concentrates the whole action in a few hours and the glides it swiftly in the flowing rhythm and the music of songs. The whole is variously coloured with picturesque feelings and fancies yet its technique of construction has nothing of the complicated structure of the Shakespearian play; it has a simple story with suspense based on the principle that the dramatic suspense has already been half-told at the very begin-

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[81] Rachanāvali Vol 1.

[82] This is stressed in the preface to *Valmiki-pratibha*.

ning. The construction is rather in the mould of the *Katha-Kathas* where "speech takes on tuneful inflexions whenever emotion comes into play." The play naturally has a single knot that has to be opened—a loose know technically viewed from the dramatic angle but a difficult one viewed from the angle of the poet's own soul. The framework is indeed simple though the struggle is intense and the poet's self-confidence is expressed with a greater amount of sureness than before. Perhaps the invocation to Saraswati gives a forestate of the mightier powers.[83]

Even the western influence is visible prominently in this play and with better effects. Its elementary manifestation is in the play's sentimental imagination which comes perhaps from the Romantics while the Poet told Thompson that "resemblance to English folk-lore" in the conception of the wood-nymphs "is not accidental." The introduction of humour through two robbers shows Tagore's greater awareness both of tragic relief and stage necessity. In *Kālamṛgayā* where Tagore uses the theme of Daśaratha's accidental shooting of a blind saint's son the comic was deliberately introduced through a *Vidūṣaka* who appears again in *Rājā O Rānī* and in a slightly modified form in *Paritrān* perhaps for the last time in Tagore's dramatic career. *Kālamṛgayā* failed miserably in that, apart from its music and songs, it had hardly any dramatic life. Because of this Tagore later on telescoped *Kālamṛgāyā* into *Vālmīki-Pratiśbhā.*

The human theme of *Vālmīki-Pratibhā* received better handling in the two succeeding plays, *Prakṛtira Pratisodha* and *Māyār Khélā*. While referring to the nature of the conflict in the former Rabindranath says:

> "Prakṛitir pratisodheo ai dwanda. Sannyasir madhye chirokaler je mānush chilo tar bandhan chinḍlo. Kavir moner madhye bajchilo mānusher jayaga."[84]

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[83] See Abanindranath Tagore: *Gharoa.*

[84] Preface to *Valmiki-prativa, op. cit.*

Māyār khélā treats in another way the same theme.[85] There is, however, in this period a playlet *Nalinī* about which Tagore had kept entirely mum in his Reminiscences. But, as his biographer says, "*Nalinī* was written to order and bears traces of *Bhagnahṛodaya* and foreshadows *Māyār khélā*." In his perface to *Māyāra Khélā* Rabindranath said that it has a resemblance to an insignificant earlier play which is this *Nalinī*.[86] As Tagore's first prose play and at his first attempt at fabricating a plot of his own, *Nalinī* deserves greater critical attention than it has so far received. Bearing the impress of his favourite name Naliniī, it is an average love-story with the conflict centering round the proverbial triangle. In the tangle of love against Nalinī, Nabin and Nirod there is of course a great deal of sentimental effusion and the feeble action of the play is soon reduced to a mere sobbing, wailing and whimpering without much of an accompanying concreteness. There is hardly any incident to test the steadfastness of love, and Nīrada's marriage with Nīrajā is but a weak device that fails to create the drama's essential sense of vividness. The end too is melodramatic with the rather sudden illness of Nīrajā and with the marriage that she arranges between Nīrajā and Nalinī. Dramatically speaking, Phuli's presence in the play is interesting because she serves not merely as a messanger but as a medium through which Nalinī expresses herself. It is nevertheless interesting that Tagore used the one-act form for such a feeble theme. and though it nad rather long dialogues, it exhibits the dramatist's attempt at the development of a crisis however weak it is.

The next play *Māyār Khelā* (1888) goes back to the musical texture of *Vālmīki-pratibhā* and *Kālamṛgayā*. It has moreover an underlying link with the other plays which Tagore described thus :

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[85] *Ibid.*

[86] *Rabindrajivani*, new edition, Vol. 1. p. 150.

"Māyār kaelai gāner bhitar diye alpa je aktukhāni natya dekha dichchey she hachchey ai je, pramadā āpnar swabhābkei jantey parey ni ahamkarey, abashe shey bhitar thekey bajlo bedana, bhanglo mitheye ahankār, prakash pelo satyakar nāri? Mayakumārider kachthekey ai bhartsana kane alo:

"Tara sukher lagi chahey prem, prem mele na,
Sudhu sukh chaley jai
Emni mayar chalana."[87]

The emphasis is clearly on the ego-centric mentality of Pramoda who because of it, failed to understand the true nature of the woman in her, just as the sannyasi in the earlier play refused to see the humanity in himself. Pain is, in such a narrow circle of pride, the only redeeming factor which enlivens your soul and brings you out of your limited outlook. The Māyākumārīs who remain invisible on the stage not only give constant reminders about the tragedy in the life of Pramoda, but suggest, like the girl in *Prakṛtira Pratiśodha*, the way out. To emphasise love merely for the sensuous enchantment is to defeat the purpose of love, these Māyākumārīs say: there must therein be pain, they seemed to suggest; that will recreate in your scul what you have lost due to an unnatural pride.

Such a theme is fairly dexterously woven in a story of conflicting love the early specimen of which is *Nalinī*. Here the tangle is more intricate, and instead of the two pairs of *Nalinī*, here we have an entire regimen of lovers in Amara, Aśoka, Kumāra, Śāntā and Pramoda. But the main development is with Amara in whose sudden love for Pramoda we discover a counterpart for Nīrada's love for Nalinī. The end is similar to that of *Nalinī* with Shanta substituted for Nīrajā and Pramode for Nalinī.

What is important about this play is that Rabindranath here makes perhaps the first attempt to recast a play of

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[87] Rachanāvali, Vol. 1. preface to *Valmiki-pratibha*.

one variety into another. For, using almost the same plot and the same theme, Rabindranath moulds the prose-play *Nalinī* into the musical play *Māyāra Khēlā*, of course chagging the names of the characters during the process. The introduction of the mysterious māyākumārīs is indeed a new feature of the play—the Māyākumārīs who, to quote Thompson,

> "chime in at intervals, observing in different phrase, 'Lord what fools these mortals be.' They have also a nebulous suggestion in them of Hardy'c Chorus of Pities as well as their more remote relationship with Oberon and his meinie of the Midsummer Night's Dream".[88]

The plot is, of course, thin, and as Tagore said :

> "In this the songs are important and not the drama. In the other a series of dramatic situations are strung on a thread of melody: this is a garland of songs with just a thread of dramatic plot running through. The play of feeling and not of action, was its essential feature. In point of fact I was, while composing it, saturated with the mood of song."[89]

The emphasis is clear while it becomes apparent when this play is compared with the later musical plays that Tagore was still trying to develop a technique where the play of feeling would coincide with mood of the songs. As we know, in some of the later musical plays an attempt was made to introduce a comparably more intricate plot in the texture of the play. Tagore's earliest musical play can therefore be safely taken to be a pointer to his later musical dramas.

The question which now arises is: why did Tagore abandon such a technique of his liking for the different

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[88] *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

[89] *Reminiscences.*

types of structure employed in plays like *Rājā O Rānī*, *Visarjana*, and *Mālinī*, though it is known that the musical play was in his very blood? The reason may be that with his ever-increasing stage awareness, the product of his personal conract with the stage,[90] he soon came to believe that a very great measure of contemporary stage success would not be his until he accepted (at least for the time being) the Shakespearian technique which Madhushudan had introduced in the Bengali drama. Jyotirindranath was in his own way continuing that tradition and it was really embarrassing for the public at large to witness performances based on any other approach. Realism was aganist Rabindranath; the use of romantic motivation was against him; and the five-act technique was against him too. His own household was saturated with the spirit of Shakespeare and in the succeeding period in his poetic arena he was trying to secure a more solid reality for himself. The result was that after stating his philosophy of life in *Prakṛtira Pratiśodha* and thereafter experimenting once again with the musical structure in *Māyāra Khèlā*, Rabindranath bacame increasingly inclined towards the depiction of character which he did in plays like *Rājā O Rānī*, *Visarjana* and *Mālinī* which had in them almost all the elements which the Bengalis had recently acquired from the British playwrights. The tradition of the acted verse-drama of the heroic-romantic variety lived with the Bengali auditor and there grew too a devotion to political causes which led a dramatist like Jyotirindranath to seek a corelation between drama and national life. There was also the pure enthusiasm for dramatic statement, for showing events as well as telling them. These constituted a peculiar kind of tradition to which Tagore tried to return in the four or five plays of his next period. The stage conditions also necessitated

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[90] *Ibid.*

such a movment back and the next group of Tagore's plays displays how a lyrical genius tries to fit himself into the tradition of his predecessors. His views on tragedy had meanwhile evolved into a concept.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF MRCCHAKATIKA by Dr. G. V. Devasthali, Professor of H. P. T. College, Nasika. Published by Poona Oriental Book House, Poona 2. Pages 4+184. 1951. Price Rs. 3-12-0.

I have gone through the book with great interest. It bears marks of sufficient originality in the presentation of facts. There is a clear analysis of the plot and delineation of characters. The author has tried to place before the readers all the aspects of the drama in so simple and lucid a manner that the book has become extremely useful and informative. The chapters on *Śūdraka* as a dramatist and on society as depicted in the *Mṛcchakaṭika* are particularly well-written. We should congratulate Dr. Devasthali, a promising scholar, for this fine achievement.

SĀHITYA SUDHAKARA. An Easy Treatise on Sanskrit Rhetoric and Prosody. By Pt. K.S. Parameswara Sastry. Printed at the Mangalodayam Press, Trichur. Pages 68. 1951. Price Re. 1.

It is a source of great pleasure to see our orthodox Pandits busy writing in Sanskrit easy treatises on different subjects. The book under review is one of that type. It deals with principal topics of Sāhitya, such as काव्यलक्षणम्, काव्यसामग्री, काव्यविभाग, रस, गुण, and दोष. But the author has dealt with the Alaṅkāras in greater details. He has also added a section on Prosody. All this has been written in easy style with easy illustrations. Thus the book has become very useful for beginners. The attempt is quite welcome even for students of higher standard for their easy reference.

TAMIL CULTURE. A quarterly dedicated to the study and diffusion of Tamil Culture. Vol. I. No. 1. Pages 96. 1952. Annual subscription Rs. 5. Edited and published by Thani Nayagam, M. A., Tamil Literature Society, 52 New Colony, Tuticorin. South India.

We welcome this new quarterly in English devoted to the spread of the best in Tamil literature and culture among the non-Tamil world. The articles are of a high standard—such as, the Life of Dr. G. V. Pope the foremost English savant and of Bharati the modern poet of Tamil Renaissance. The address of the President of the Dravidian Languages and Culture section of the last All-India Oriental Conference at Lucknow is also included. We wish the journal many years of useful activity.

A. S. NATARAJA AYYAR.

A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ASSAM. Early Period. Vol. I. By Dr. B.K. Barua, M.A., Ph.D., Reader, Gauhati University. 1951. Pages xvi+223 and plates xxxv and a map. Price Rs. 15.

Dr. B. K. Barua is a well-known figure in the scholarly world. He has published several interesting papers on Assamese literature and culture. The volume under review is the first attempt to reconstruct the cultural history of Assam from the earliest times to the thirteenth century. As, for a background, the study of political history is inevitable, a chapter is devoted to it. The cultural history is divided into The Political Institutions and Administration; Land and Agriculture; Varṇa and Āśrama; Education and Learning; Religion and Fine Arts including architecture, sculpture and iconography. The major portion of the materials has been principally collected from inscriptions, contemporary

literature and travellers' accounts. The book is on the whole very interesting and gives a lot of information about the ancient culture of Assam.

After our independence we are vitally interested in the cultural stock-taking of our country and in prescribing the cultural history of India as a compulsory subject in our Universities. The book under review is a very useful contribution by a sound scholar. We wish the plates had been printed better, on finer art paper, bringing out the features of the images etc., more boldly. Students will eagerly expect the second volume bringing the history of Assam from the 13th century up to date.

Assam, geographically a small unit of India, played a most distinct and important role as a transmitter of Aryan civilisation in lands like Tibet, Nepal and Burma. In fact Assam is the frontier outpost of Indian civilisation. It is a common assumption that Assam is Pāṇḍava-varjita, i. e., a country not visited by the Pāṇḍavas, and so untouched by the civilising contact of the Aryans. The chapters of the present work should be able to dispel this misconception. Assam in the mediaeval period became a fertile soil for Tantra worship. It was here that the *Kālikā Purāṇa*, the ritualistic manual, was writren. Of the four *Pīṭhas* or sacred places associated with Tantra worship, Kāmākhyā and Śrīhaṭṭa belong to Assam. The book under review contains almost everything which could be gleaned about the cultural history of Assam. For these reasons the book ought to be very useful for the students of Ancient Indian History as well as the general reader.

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1. The Astrological Magazine, Vol. 41. 1952. Annual Number. Editor B. V. Raman. Pp. 168.
2. Hindu Predictive Astrology. By B. V. Raman. 5th Edition 1951. Price Rs. 9. Pp. 355.

3. HOW TO JUDGE A HOROSCOPE, Part I; 4th Edition. 1950. By B. V. Raman. Price Rs. 3-12-0; pp. 146.
4. ASTROLOGY AND MODERN THOUGHT. 2nd Edition. 1950. By B. V. Raman. Price Rs. 2-4-0; Pages 86.
5. VARSHAPHAL OR THE HINDU PROGRESSED HOROSCOPE,. Pages 98. 5th Edition, 1950. Rs. 3. By B. V. Raman All published by Raman Publications, Bangalore 3. South India.

All the above works are by Dr. B. V. Raman who has already established his name as the author of several works on Astrology and Astronomy. He has also contributed the articles on Jyotisa and Astronomy to the *Cultural Heritage of India*—Rama Krishna Mission, Calcutta. Without going into the question of free will and fate, or whether Astrology is a science or not, we may take that Astrology has come to stay amongst us both in the east and in the west. Hence, it is necessary to have the best scientific idea of its contents and for the same we cannot recommend anything better than the study of the above works. The *Astrological Magazine* mentioned above contains very good articles. It also contains a good review of the latest publications on Astrology in English, Hindi and Marathi.

BRHADYOGI - YĀJNAVALKYA-SMṚTI. Edited by Swami Kuvalayananda and Pandit Raghunatha Shastri Kokaje and Published by the Kaivalyadhāma S. M. Y. M. Samiti, Lonavla, Dist. Poona. Pp. 24 + 249. Price Rs. 10. 1951.

The Kaivalyadhāma of Lonavla has been doing a great service to the cause of the physical well-being of humanity through theoretical and practical yogic means. It has

published very useful works on various important aspects of yogic practices from time to time. The book under review is a unique publication of the Yoga-Mandira Samiti.

We have had references of वृद्धयाज्ञवल्क्य and योगियाज्ञवल्क्य. But no Smṛti of any one of these had been so far published. We are grateful to the Kaivalyadhāma for bringing into light for the first time the *Bṛhadyogiyājñavalkya-Smṛti*. It has 12 Chapters. The editor has added 3 Pariśiṣṭas and several appendices. The book has been very carefully edited with copious foot-notes giving different readings from the quotations found in other Nibandhas.

From the study of the two Smṛtis, it is evident that these are two different books. As to the question of the identity of their authorship, it is not at all possible to say anything definitely. Both these two याज्ञवल्क्य's belonged to Mithiia and there are many similar lines in both the books. Moreover, in the *Vīramitrodaya*, a well-known Nibandha, we find योगियाज्ञवल्क्य—वृद्धमनु—वृद्धशातातप—वृद्धवशिष्ठ—लघुहारीतस्मरणानि षट्त्रिंशत्स्मृतिकार कर्तृकाण्येव अवस्थाभेदेन तैरेव करणात्। अतएव याज्ञवल्क्येनोक्तं योगशास्त्रं च मत्प्रोक्तमिति। योगियाज्ञवल्क्यग्रन्थे 'स्नानमब्दैवतैर्मन्त्रैर्यत्त्वयोक्तं पुराऽनघ–' इति योगियाज्ञवल्क्य प्रति ऋषिप्रश्ने याज्ञवल्क्यग्रन्थोक्तस्नानानुवादश्चच । एवं वृद्धमन्वादीनामपि मन्वाद्य-भेदः शिष्टप्रसिद्ध्यादिभिरवगन्तव्यः (vide वीरमित्रोदय-परिभाषाप्रकाश p. 16 Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Edition.) Thus, it may be said that the same याज्ञवल्क्य wrote both these two smṛtis.

The editor and the Kaivalyadhama Mandira both deserve our hearty congratulations for bringing out such an important text for the first time.

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